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SUMMARY 
This four-month study was sponsored by the NASA-Langley 
Research Center Off~ce of Technology Utilization and Applica-
t~ons Programs to exam~ne areas where aerospace technology 
could be of possible benefit to the orthoped~c implant indus-
try. Specif~cally, the study examined structural and mater~­
als approaches used by aerospace for h~gh rel~ability compo-
nents for poss~ble appl~cations in metallic implants. 
The study involved gather~ng data from the l~terature, 
from a l~m~ted number of visits to manufacturers of ~mplants, 
and from numerous teleconferences and correspondence with the 
Food ann Dru~ ~dministration (Fn~), universities, manufac-
turers, physician:., and Material suppl~ers. 
The find~ngs of the study are: 
o No published, ~plant ~ndustry-w~de design cr~teria 
such as min~mum stat~c factor-of-safety, scatter factors for 
use in fatigue analyses, and methods for determ~ning expected 
l~fe in use were ava~lable. Examples are provided in the 
report from NASA, Air Force, and FAA giving approaches to 
these analyses, criter~a, and documentat~on. 
o The limited number of alloys used ~n ~mplants have 
been tested in var~ous programs for mechan~cal performance. 
However, there appears to be a need for MIL-HDBK-5-type des~gn 
allowables to establish uniform values to be used ~n design. 
Examples of stat~stical data requ~rements and MIL-HDBK-5 data 
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presentat10n are prov1ded in the report. The use of pre-
cracked specimens to evaluate structural degradat10n of alloys 
1n contact with fluids by the NASA manned space program 1S 
described and suggested as a way of evaluat1ng body fluids 
and alloy structural compatibil1ty. 
o Use of fin1te element stress analysis and fracture 
mechan1cs analyses 1n the 1mplant design cycle w111 requ1re 
additional loads and materials data but offer substant1al 
potential in understanding of the implant performance and 
offer analyt1cal tools that could shorten evaluation and ver1-
f1cation times for new designs and mater1als. References 
are prov1ded for the readers. 
o Examples of quant1fY1ng the results of nondestructive 
inspect10n from penetrant, radiography, and ultrasonic methods 
are prov1ded from NASA programs. If ~ondestructive ~estinq 
(N~~) is to be utilize~ as a basis for in1t1al fla~ Slze in 
fracture mechanics, the implant industry should develop Slm1-
lar data. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aerospace industry has been forced to face the prob-
lem of single-point fa1lures in structures from the time of 
the Wright brothers to the current Space Shuttle program. 
Regardless of the level of redundancy allowed in some config-
urat10ns, eventually, one finds a "critical" structural ele-
ment. Perhaps it's a pressure vessel, a pressur1zed crew 
compartment wall, a landing gear trunnion or a separat10n 
bolti the funct1on, S1ze, shape, and material can vary S1g-
n1ficantly but the criticality brings the br1ght light of 
scrutiny to every aspect of design, development, fabr1cation, 
qual1f1cat1on, and individual part acceptance procedures of 
these cr1tical parts. Every reasonable effort 1S made to 
1nsure that these parts have the highest reI1ab111ty--a safe 
life structure. 
The progress10n from early aircraft to current superson1c 
aircraft and manned spacecraft has made the problem more severe 
and more visible. The need to ach1eve the most efficient 
structure consistent with high reliability has led NASA to 
general technolog1es and methodologies that could be used 
in any industry with similar problems. One such industry 
where NASA hopes these approaches can be used is biomed1cal 
engineering; this report examines the requirements of one 
very specific area in this broad f1eld--metallic orthoped1c 
implants. 
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Intuitively, and confirmed by discussions with ~mplant 
fabricators, the most ~mportant requ~rement placed on the 
implant des~gn ~s that of performance. Certainly, satisfy~ng 
the need, whether for a fixation device to hold bone fragments 
together until natural fusion occurs or for an art~ficial 
jo~nt to replace a section of bone as a "permanent" implant, 
is the most important aspect of the design. As part of the 
requ~red performance, the engineer must determ~ne the ability 
of the des~gn to satisfy funct~on an~ hopefully, assure that 
the expected safe life of the device ~s suffic~ently long 
for the body to heal itself (~n the case of the ~nternal fixa-
t~ve device) or for a long period of time before replacement 
is necessary (as w~th the prosthesis dev~ces). 
Another po~nt to consider ~s that the metal ~mplant ~s 
only one component of a biomechan~cal "system" cons~st~ng 
of bone, cement, screws, and the metal ~mplant ~n conf~gura­
tionsand cond~t~ons that vary with the operating procedure 
and the individual patient. Th~s study examines the metal 
~mplant only, as a way of studying one of the elements of 
the "system~" certainly, each element must be examined lead~ng 
eventually to a complete understanding of the system. 
The overall serv~ce record of metallic orthoped~c implants 
~s excellent~ structural fa~lures are reported to const~tute 
less than 1% of the causes for removal of devices from pat~ents 
whereas most requ~ring removal are because of corrosion, pa~n 
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or other forms of b10incompatibility (Ref. 1-5) . In a sim1lar 
manner, the h1story of structural failures in manned space-
craft dur1ng f11ght 1S "acceptable" stat1st1cally, but the 
failure of any primary structural element that resulted in 
the loss of the astronaut would certa1nly be an internat10nal 
catastrophe. The pat1ent who must endure the pain and trauma 
of removal of any premature structural fa11ure of a metal11c 
implant must certainly feel that the problem 1S a personal 
verS10n of a catastrophe. 
It is NASA's desire, indeed a part of 1tS organizat10n 
charter, to 1nsure max1mum d1sseminat10n of the knowledge 
ga1ned 1n develop1ng space act1vit1es for the general better-
ment of mank1nd. Therefore, the princ1pal obJectives of th1s 
study are to exam1ne s1milarit1es 1n mater1als and structural 
requirements of high reliab111ty aerospace components with 
the structural and material requ1rements for metal11c ortho-
pedic 1mplants and to outline available aerospace approaches 
to the potent1al solut10ns of these problems. The sincere 
hope of the authors and the sponsor is that some of these 
approaches might be useful to the doctors, manufacturers, 
and researchers working in this very important technology. 
Measurement values 1n the report are generally expressed 
in the un1ts used 1n the references from wh1ch the 
mater1al was taken. No attempts were made to convert 
these data from conventional to SI un1ts or V1ce versa. 
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DISCUSSION 
General: 
There are many ways to classlfy metallic internal ortho-
pedic implants and to dlSCUSS requlrements for these devices. 
One way is to dlvlde the devlces into internal fixatlve de-
Vlces and lnternal prostheses. Some examples of the devlces 
by these categories are: 
Internal Flxatlve DeVlces 
o Nalls, plns, Wlres 
o Plates, bars 
o Screws, staples 
(Used to hold elements together until healing occurs) 
Prostheses 
o Artificial hlP, knee, elbow, shoulder Drostheses 
o Mandlbular prostheses 
o Proximal or dlstal ulna prostheses 
o Tibia prostheses 
(Used to replace parted or degraded body elements) 
A tabulatlon of many of the metalllc implants and a descrip-
tion of their indlvidual function is found ln Table 1. 
As a measure of the importance of this field, it is esti-
mated that some 2 milllon to 3 million artificlal or prosthetlc 
parts are lmplanted into lndividuals ln the United States 
each year (Ref. 6 ); the number worldwlde is unknown, but ob-
viously represents a very large field of activity. 
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LOCATION 
NAHE 
Skull 
Arteries 
Mandible 
vertebra 
ClaVlcle 
Scapula 
Chest 
Shoulder 
TPBLE 1 
A CLJlSSIFICATIml OF METALS TO H1PLANT 
LOCATIONS AND FlH1C'TIONS 
IHPLANT 
NN'lE 
Skull Plates, 
Screws, Wire 
Hesh 
Clips 
l1andibular 
Prosthesis, 
Bone Plate 
and Wire 
!1esh 
Harrinqton 
Rods 
Spinal 
Plates and 
~1ires 
C'laVlcular 
Nails, Screws 
and pins 
Carpal Sca-
phOld Screws 
Pacemaker 
Shoulder 
Prosthesis 
Jewett Nall 
and Plate 
Staples 
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P~PJ..J\NT 
FUNCTION 
cranioplasty 
Treatment of 
Aneurysm 
TYPE 
r~ET]lL 
Co-Cr-Mo 
Tltaniurl, 
Tantalum 
Type 316 SS 
Gold, Silver 
Reconstruc- Co-Cr-Mo 
tive Appllances 
for the Jaw 
Treatment of Type 316 SS 
Scoliosis 
Splnal 'Fusion 
Fixation 
of clavlcle 
dislocation 
or fracture 
~eduction of 
fractures of 
the carpal 
scaphoid bone 
Heart-asslst 
devices 
Proxlmal 
Humeral Re-
placement 
Flxation of 
Proximal End 
of Humerus 
Type 316 SS 
Type 316 SS 
Type 316 S5 
Titanimn, Plat-
inUJT\-IridiUJl1, 
!'llckel Jllloys, 
Elglloy 
Co-Cr-Mo 
Type 316 SS 
and Co-Cr-Mo 
LOCATION 
NN'lE 
Humerus 
Ulna 
Radius 
Hand and 
Fingers 
Hip 
(Table 1, Cont'd) 
H1PLANT 
NNv1E 
Stevens-Street 
Elbow Pros-
thesis 
Mechanical 
Elbow joint 
Kuntscher 
Humerus Nail 
Proximal or 
Distal Ulna 
Prosthesis 
Kuntscher V-
type, Vesely-
Street Split 
type, and 
Schneider Self-
Broaching 
Intramedullary 
Nails 
Radius Cap or 
Head Pros-
thesis 
Y Plates and 
Kuntscher V-
type Radius 
Nail 
Flatt Finger 
and Thumb 
Prosthesis 
Flnger Bone 
Plates and 
Screws 
Hip Pros-
thesls Several 
Types 
Hip Nails, 
Pins, Plates, 
Staples, and 
Screws 
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H1PLANT 
FUNCTION 
Peconstructlon 
Device for the 
Elbow 
Replacement 
Prosthesis 
Humeral 
Fracture F1X-
ation 
~eplacement of 
Proximal and 
Distal Ends of 
Ulna 
Fracture Fix-
ation of Ulna 
Help Restore 
Functlon of 
Elbow Joint 
Radius Frac-
ture Fixatlon 
Restoration of 
Flnger Joint 
Functlon 
Flxation of 
Small Bone 
Fractures 
Replacement of 
Femoral Head 
Hip Fracture 
Flxation 
TYPE 
METAL 
Ti-6Al-4V 
Co-Cr-]v\o 
Type 316 SS 
Co-Cr-Mo 
Type 316 SS 
Co-Cr-]v\o 
Type 316 SS 
Co-Cr-Mo 
Type 316 SS 
Co-Cr-Mo 
Titanium 
Type 316 SS 
LOCATION 
NAME 
Femur 
Knee 
Tibia 
Fibula 
Tarsal 
and 
Metatar-
sal 
(Table 1, Concluded) 
Il'IIPLANT 
NNm 
Femoral Blade 
plates and 
Screw Combina-
tions Bone Plate 
and Screw or 
\'71re Devices 
Intramedullary 
Nail-Several 
Types 
Knee 
Prosthesis-
Several Types 
Tibia Pros-
thesis-Several 
Types 
Townley Tibia 
Plateau Plate 
and Screws 
Tibla Bolt 
and Tibia 
(Intramedul-
lary) Nail 
Kuntscher 
Olecranur 
Fibula Flap 
Nail 
Small Bone 
Plates and 
Screws 
Ir1PLANT 
FUNCTION 
Fixation of 
Slngle and 
Multiple 
Fractures 
of the Femur 
Replacement 
of Dlseased 
(e.g. , 
arthritic) 
Knees 
Replacement 
of Tibia 
Shelf 
Replacement 
arthroplasty 
of the Tibia 
Shelf 
Fracture 
Fixation 
of the 
Tibia 
Shaft 
Fracture 
Fixation 
of the 
Fibula 
Fracture 
Fixation 
of Small 
Bones 
(REF. 27.) 
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TYPE 
HETl\L 
Type 316 
SS 
Co-Cr-Mo 
Co-Cr-Mo 
Type 316 
5S 
Type 316 
SS 
Type 316 
SS 
Type 316 
SS 
The maJor requ~rements for ~nternal f~xat~on dev~ces 
such as pins, nails, and wires are biocompatibility, corro-
sion resistance, and mechan~cal strength. Certa~nly, an ~ntra­
medullary nail to treat a fractured femur as illustrated ~n 
Figure I-a is subject to bending loads of a cycl~c nature 
and a Hansen-Street nail to fuse a knee Joint is subject to 
bend~ng loads as ~llustrated in Figure I-b. Other devices 
such as w~res, screws, and plates are subject to combined 
loads of vary~ng magn~tudes and for different periods of t~me 
and numbers of cycles. As w~ll be seen later ~n the report, 
protheses such as the total hip or total shoulder, elbow, 
or knee prostheses are also subJect to loads that vary widely 
from design-to-des~gn and are subJect to load spectra that 
d~ffer w~th patients and ~nd~vidual load conditions w~th each 
pat~ent assoc~ated with different activ~t~es. 
Reports c~t~ng causes of structural failures in ortho-
ped~c implants are numerous, but in an effort to exam~ne the 
areas need~ng specif~c attention, summaries such as the ones 
c~ted ~n Table 2 are very helpful in def~n~ng locat~ons 
of fa~lures in the var~ous desians and identifying the ~redom­
inant failure modes. Cont~nued evaluation and analys~s of 
this type is certainly a worthwhile activity. 
All mater~als used in both categor~es of internal implants 
must meet stringent requirements of compatibil~ty w~th the 
host tissue and conversely, the body environment can also 
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~REGION Of LARGEST 
BENO I NG ~MENT 
(A) Intramedullary (B) Hansen-Street Nail 
Nal.l 
FIGUP.E 1 
Exru~PLES OF BENDING LOADS OF A CYCLIC 
NP.TURE n~POSED ON METALLIC Il1PLANTS 
(REF. 7) 
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locatIon of Imphnt fracture and IdentIfIcatIon 
of fracture I10de for HIP Prosthesu 
Implant rracture locatIon 
loc.hon (Approx.) of rracture 
Zone from Dutal Stefl Tlp 
In. (2.5 em) 
In. (5.0 em) 
2\ In (6 4 em) 
In (7 6 COl) 
J\ In (8 9 em) 
rracture Modeb 
MechanIcal fahgue 
CorroSlon fatlgue 
Per cent 
4 
66 
8 
"r racture assoclated wIth weld repur or "enOuS c89tlng defect. 
brracture origIn predOtlllnately at the lateral surface and wIth a 
bendlng-tors.Lonal \lector. 
cUml ted to otalnleoo steel 
locahon of Impllnt fractura and ldentlflcatlon of 
fracture Hode for Bone Plate 
Implant rracture Location 
1st acrew hole or alot 
frem center of p18te 
2nd acrew hole or alot 
from center of p18te 
Per cent 
locahon of l""lant fracture ."d Identlflcatlon of 
rracture Mode for Intramedullary Nalls 
Implant rracture location (Approx zone) Per cent 
1/3 length frOll proxlaal hp 
1/2 length frOll proullal tip 
At thread. or broach area 
fracture Hodea 
Mechanlcal fatlgue 
rahgue corrosionb 
n 
17 
8 
45 
55 
aApproxlllateJy 17: of fractured n&lIs poseesaed detectable 
bendIng puor to fracture 
blllllted to atunl ... ateel. 
locatIOn of Implant fracture Mode IdentlflcatlOn 
(By per cent apprOXlmatlon) 
Inlertrochanleuc NaIl/plate CombInatIOn 
locatlon of Metal rracture Per cent 
Jet Screw 2nd Scre" 
Nul .>..nchon Hole Hole 
One plece 20 25 45 10 
Two pIece 10 20 55 15 
Sl1dlng nall 25 5 60 10 
fracture Mode rallure Hodea 
Mechanlcal fatIgue 
fatlgue corroalona 
allmlted to .talnless steel 
60 
llechanlcal fatlgueb 56 
ratlgue corrosIon 40 
Bendlng 4 
"crevIce anc1/or frettlng corrosion of bone acre. holes detected in 
75~ of the Implants ."'Olned. 
bYhe croas aectl.on penetrated by the r.tlgue crack 18 larger 1n 
the fat.gue corroOlon IIOde than mechanlca! fatIgue 
TAB I.E 2 
SU!1!WRY OF Fl'Ir.efl.E 
110 F]'.ILED ~mT"J.JLIC 
(REF. 8) 
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DAT_~ ON 
H!PLANTS 
affect the phys~cal and mechan~cal propert~es of the alloys. 
Therefore, a mutually compat~ble material and environment 
must be assured for a successful design. 
In addition, loads (stresses) and load spectra can be 
severe and can vary widely from patient to patient. For ex-
ample, loads on implant components can be several t~mes the 
body we~ght and, as ~n the case of the h~p prosthesis, 400,000 
cycles per year can be expected for normal activ~ty and much 
h~gher for some classes of pat~ents. 
L~m~ted usable volume for the implant coupled w~th the 
natural need to reduce weight of the device has led to unusual 
shapes and conf~gurations made of high strength alloys. 
Therefore, the overall design requ~rements picture for 
metals can be summarized ~n the following needs: 
o Biocompatibility w~th body t~ssue and flu~ds 
o Corros~on resistance ~n body env~ronments 
o Satisfactory life under cyclic loads 
o High strength, low density alloys. 
As a compar~son, modern aircraft and spacecraft designs 
must meet many of the same requirements. For example, the 
designs of manned spacecraft of the 1970's certainly required 
compatibil~ty of design and materials in very hostile environ-
ments, ~ncluding resistance to corros~on from extremely cor-
rosive fluids and gases. Obviously, weight and volume had 
to be m~nim~zed which led to the uses of high strength alloys 
in h~ghly efficient (low margin-of-safety) designs. The 
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advent of the Space Shuttle 1n the 1980's has added the require-
ment for repeated loads and missions requir1ng mil110ns of 
cycles on components while ma1ntaining the high reliability 
required for single-load path critical structure. 
Therefore, an 1nteresting and helpful compar1son can 
be made of the approaches to these problems by both 1ndustries. 
The compar1sons are organized under the follow1ng headings: 
o Design definit10n and des1gn criteria 
o Mater1al selection and data base for des1gn 
o Analysis methods/certificat1on 
o Acceptance testing and 1nspect10n. 
Where informat1on 1S available on orthopedic 1mplants, 
a d1scussion 1S given and compar1sons with aerospace approaches 
are prov1ded; 1n several areas, the 1nformat10n on 1mplants 
is not available so that only the aerospace approach 1S des-
cr1bed for that part1cular area. It 1S hoped that the examples 
suppl1ed from aerospace experience can be used by readers 
workin~ 1n the field of metal11c implants to the1r advantage. 
A systematic approach to des1gn qua11f1cat1on and per-
formance verification is not new to the orthopedic 1mplant 
industry. An example of a logic d1agram that closely resem-
bles those in use by the aerospace industry 1S found in the 
followinq figure. 
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~ ,':,,[. Or:f\.,TJ'~ P"AC7ICES FOR DESIG' QU>'LlF1C,TlO' 
~\D PERfO~~~':E \ ERIFICAT!O\ 
Establlst deslgn 
~ ____________ --"IP concept and 
"':;-.~_-.l._" ... 
r.:: ~"e o1;:!e-.: ..... lo.o.\ of ~eSl;"1 
crltefla 
1 
Pro\ lde deSlgn 
descnptlon ('''T'Y) 
Dehne sen lce 
"'""rOO" 
Perform deslgn 
anal'SlS 
smssanal~~ 
o1"1d Se~\lCe correlatIon :~terlal 
':::s~rlptlon 
e-\ l:'ornent ( / 
~ 
Es:abl1sh a 
prehnnal") estl'tate 
" '''T'"'' 
lerlf) performance 
"''''T''''> 
Establlsh a f,nal 
L-____________ -« estllTate of lJIlplant 
performance 
propertles 
This chart was used by Mr. J. Howard Butler in a 1978 
(Ref. 9 briefing to the Orthopedic Device Classif1cation 
Panel of the Food and Drug Adm1nistration. The use, accep-
tance, or rejection of elements of the cycle by the 1ndustry 
are d1scussed in later sections of the report. 
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Design Definition and Design Criteria 
Aerospace: 
In a classical aerospace structural design problem, after 
the hardware function is well defined, the first piece of 
needed information is an evaluation of the loads and the load 
spectrum. Usually, some preliminary loads data are available 
from previous applicable experiences which can be combined 
with other inputs such as environments, functional limits, 
or special needs placed on the design. A good example of 
"other limitations" ml.ght be the volume aval.lable for the 
hardware or details on interfacing hardware that must work 
in combinatl.on with the design in question. From the loads 
input, the designer can make a rough evaluation of the crl.t-
l.cal load path and the sense of the load; i.e., l.S the part 
critical l.n tension?, compression?, stiffness critical? Does 
the interfacing hardware pose specl.al needs for jOl.nl.ng or 
deflection load path compatibility? Is the load predoroinant-
ly static or is it highly cyclic in nature? 
Next, the designer must consider any appll.cable manda-
tory design criteria whl.ch must be met in order to comply 
with the customers' requl.rements. Examples in industry ml.ght 
be the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Unfired Pres-
sure Vessel Code or in aerospace, might be the FAA Airworthl.-
ness Standards (Ref. 10), or MIL-A-8868 "Airplane Strength 
and Rigl.dity-Reliabl.lity Requirements, Repeated Loads and 
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Fatigue" (Ref. 11). NASA has issued a serles of Special 
Publlcations providing design criteria for various elements 
of spacecraft deslgni perhaps the most applicable belng SP-80S? 
"Structural Deslgn Criteria Applicable to a Space Shuttle" 
(Ref. 12). The significant sections of this document are 
discussed in the report. 
The designer then conslders all of the lnputs and llmits 
to develop a design that: 
(a) Meets the functional needs 
(b) Meets the contractual or mandatory deslgn crlteria 
(c) Can be analyzed by stress analysls methods for detail-
ed slzing, llfe calculatlons, factors of safety, etc., to 
prove conformance to requirements. 
Together with the stress analyst, the designer determlnes 
critical load conditions that are resolved into stresses by 
considering areas, inertias, and by uSlng appropriate stress 
formulas and the preliminary selection of a material with the 
requislte mechanical properties. Most often, lteratlons back 
through the cycle are needed as more load definition is made 
available from tests or analysis and new requlrements are 
developed. 
In the case of aerospace hardware, many examples of design 
criteria are found in both guideline form and mandatory design 
performance specifications. For example, in NASA SP-80S? 
(Ref. 12) the following are found: 
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" 4 . 8 SERVICE LIFE 
4.8.1 SAFE-LIFE 
Safe-life design concepts shall be 
applied to all structure vital to the integ-
rity of the vehicle or the safety of person-
nel. The safe-life shall be determined by 
analysls and test to be at least four times 
the specifled service llfe. 
The determlnation of structural safe-life 
shall take into consideration the effects 
of the followlng factors ln combinatlon wlth 
the expected operating environments: 
o Material properties and fallure 
mechanisms 
o Load spectra 
o Cyclic-loads effects 
o Sustained-loads effects 
o Cumulative combined damage. 
For structure requiring a safe-llfe design, 
such as metallic pressure vessels or landlng 
gears, any flaws that cannot be detected 
ln a regularly scheduled lnspection should 
not grow enough before the next scheduled 
inspection to degrade the strength of the 
structure below that required to sustain 
loads at temperatures deflned by the llmlt-
load and critlcal-temperature envelopes. 
Analysis of flaw growth should account for 
materials propertles, structural concepts, 
and operatlng stress levels throughout the 
structure, including adverse effects from 
variations in operational usage and environ-
ments. The inspection procedures should 
be considered adequate only when they can 
readily detect all flaws or defects greater 
than the allowable slzes." 
In Sectlon 7, "Proof of Deslgn," section 7.1.2 states: 
" 
7.1. 2 ANALYSIS 
Reports shall be prepared on analy-
ses performed to verify structural adequa-
cy. The reports shall be dlvided logically 
by subject and shall include results of at 
least the following: (1) loads analyses; 
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(2) thermal analyses; (3) stress analy-
ses; and (4) structural dynamic response 
and stability analyses. " 
To guard against premature fracture of critical structural 
elements, Rockwell International, the company building the 
Orbiter flight veh~cle for the Shuttle program has contrac-
tually imposed a fracture control plan (Ref. 13 ) that re-
qu~res,by analys~s and test, demonstrat~on that "all primary 
structural components shall be designed to serv~ce a m~nimum 
of four service lifetimes". A detailed plan for the necessary 
analysis ~s ~ncluded in this document. 
All des~gn drawings in the Space Shuttle Orbiter program 
are to be signed and approved by the des~gn group, the stress 
group and a mater~als eng~neer at a m~nimum to ~nsure that 
all s~gn~ficant technical disciplines are involved. The 
argument that this is costly and time-consuming ~s countered 
by numerous examples where hardware failures or f~eld retro-
fitting cost many times more than the review cycle that would 
have brought the problem to light and l~kely avoided it. 
The Department of Transportation, Federal Av~at~on Ad-
min~stration, has also published methods and design criteria 
for structures such as critical wing structure of small a~r-
planes (Appendix B).In a s~milar manner to NASA's approach, 
the FAA has determ~ned fat~gue factors for safe-life struc-
tures that vary with the level of analys~s, testing, or com-
binations. These factors and the d~scuss~on of the rat~onale 
that is used for the various factors are provided ~n Appendix 
-19-
B. Other crlteria for static loads and analysis requirements 
are avallable from the Federal AVlation Agency. 
Orthopedlc Implants: 
In the case of metalllc lmplants, the Federal Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act with amendments in 1976, covering medlcal 
devices such as implants, groups devices into three categories; 
Class I. General controls which include regulatlons 
concerning good manufacturing practlce and 
fraudulent mislabeling. 
Class II. Performance standards which must be met to 
control device risks. 
Class III. Premarket approval, for those devices for 
which performance standards cannot control 
device rlsks adequately. 
The decislon as to which class is appropriate is made 
by the Bureau of Medical Devices on the basls of recommenda-
tions from a classification panel, WhlCh reaches ltS decision 
on the basis of existing data and polling of expert opinlon. 
To date, the Orthopedic Classification Panel has placed the 
vast majority of orthopedlc lmplants into Class II, "perform-
ance standards." 
A new design for a device or a change in materials tech-
nology or manufacturing methods could result in a Class III 
category by the FDA, which can require clinical evaluation 
by more than one physician-investigator using the implant 
at one or more in~titutions. 
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These FDA regulat~ons deal more with development of in-
vivo pre-commercialization use history and not with require-
ments for detailed des~gn data and structural qual~fication 
tests and analysis. Indeed, there appears to be no publ~shed, 
un~form design cr~terionapplicable to the metallic ~mplants. 
While several art~cles in the literature cite general state-
ments regarding implant loads as a function of body we~ght 
or physical funct~on, only a few describe a "biomechan~c" 
approach to defining loads and reactions and little or no 
information is available from the literature or from limited 
discuss~ons with manufacturers regarding stress analyses, 
design life criter~a, factors-of-safety, or other cr~teria 
for comparison with aerospace design approaches. 
The development of such criteria to provide a minimum 
acceptable level of design capab~lity is indeed a form~dable 
task in that the loads are highly var~able and the factor 
to be placed on a use load, for example, to arrive at a 
"limit" or "design ultimate" load could easily require a 
conf~guration that is ~ncompatible with the useful volume 
for the implant. In addition, as in the case of the femoral 
stem of a hip prosthesis, the des~gn objectives are not well 
defined. For example the following ~s cited: 
"Stem design reduces to a problem of 
determining optimal geometry if the material 
properties are known. But what should the 
design objective be? At th~s point, the 
answer is not clear. If the goal is to 
reduce bending stresses in the stem, then 
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the approxlmate I-sections proposed 
recently by some are not optimum Slnce 
the stresses can be further reduced 
by addlng additl0nal materlal to in-
crease the section modulus. But this 
procedure will reduce the amount of 
cement ln the cavity, and the ques-
tion then becomes one of determining 
the effects of cement thickness on 
stresses in the cement. Further 
parametric studies are needed to 
document these effects and to identi-
fy appropriate design objectives 
WhlCh can, in turn, provlde the basis 
for routine design procedures and 
standards." (Ref. 15.) 
Coupled with thlS basic uncertainty is the concern over 
legal aspects of "design standardization" and the lmpllca-
tions that such regulations citing these standards brlng. 
For example: 
"Naturally, as I previously 
stated, as a result of all of the 
flndlngs, certaln standards and 
possible even laws or regulations 
will be enacted by lndependent 
bodies such as ASTM or through 
regulatl0ns enacted by Congress. 
One of the greatest dangers we have 
in this area and one that you should 
be aware of is the legal result of 
the imposltion of standards which 
cannot be reasonably met or followed 
or are arbitrary to an industry as 
a whole and apply to devlces for 
WhlCh the standards really do apply." 
(Ref. 16. ) 
While these arguments and impediments call for cautlon 
and discretion, the flrst step toward development of usable 
and useful design criterla should likely begln with an as-
sessment of the capability of existing, successful devlces. 
It would seem prudent to determine and apply criterla derived 
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from successful deslgns to newer models or modlficatlons, or 
for that matter, to Slmllar devices. Indeed, such an approach 
might be useful in reduclng the approval tlmes for new designs 
from a mechanlcal standpoint. "Qualificatlon by-similarity" 
is an accepted approach in aerospace if the hardware ln ques-
tion is (from an engineerlng standpolnt) proved sufflciently 
similar to existing, flight-qualified components. 
Perhaps as an oversimpliflcatl0n, one mlght conslder 
that a partlcular deslgn of a femoral component of a hip 
prosthesls is highly successful from a use standpolnt whlle 
another design for the same application has suffered from 
limited life or other structural shortcomings. Stress analy-
sis supplemented by tests may show some very slgnlficant 
dlfferences in maximum stress level, fat~gue stress ratio, 
material strength level, etc. Certainly, any criterion such 
as a factor of safety based on ultimate tensile strength 
or a mlnimum moment of inertia or other major dlfferences 
in design characteristics should lead to a beginning of a 
des~gn cr~ter~on useful to the field. A good example of 
this approach is alluded to in the follow~ng: 
"Fatigue l~fe, as a funct~on of mean 
and alternating stress, can be represent-
ed using a Goodman diagram; and this pro-
cedure has been used to est~mate factors 
of safety for varlOUS situations. For a 
Charnley stern in a neutral or~entation in 
a 150 lb. patient, the factor of safety 
is estimated to be 1.85 for infin~te life. 
For the Aufranc-Turner stern, where the 
peak tensile stresses are about 13 ksi, 
the factor of safety on the tensile side 
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is about 1.42. For a neutrally orlented 
Charnley stem in a 200 lb. patient, the 
factor of safety is 1.39, and for varus 
orlentation in a 200 lb. patient, the 
factor of safety is about 1.1. . .• 
These rough estimates, based on beam-
theory considerations and loading in the 
media11atera1 plane only, suggest that 
some existing hip lmplant systems may be 
operating at the limit of their strength. 
Furthermore, the effects of larger peak 
loads, due to greater activlty in younger 
patients, and the effects of corrOSlon 
will further reduce the factor of safety 
of the devlce. Consequently, it is possible 
that fatigue failure of bone-implant systems 
may not be a rare occurrence when these 
devices are used in younger, more actlve 
patients. At the very least, the questlon 
of fatigue strength should be one of con-
tlnuing concern as better information 
becomes aval1ab1e." (Ref. 17 j ) 
As an example, the statlc factors-of-safety used in 
various structural elements of manned spacecraft are found 
in the table below: 
FACTORS OF SAFETY 
COMPONENT 
General unpressurized structure 
Wlndows, doors, and hatches 
Pressurized structure 
Pressurized 11nes and fittings 
Main propellant tank 
Pressure vessels (other than 
propellant tanks) 
(Ref. 12.) 
-24-
ULTIMATE 
1.5 
3.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
1.4 
2.0 
It would seem to be a logical extension of existing 
studies to develop criteria for certain groups of critical 
implants. One m~ght suggest as an example (not to be used 
literally) : 
Hip Prosthes~s, Femoral Component (example only) 
o Max~mum vertical and horizontal deflect~on under 
load of ___ newtons applied to ball at 0° to ax~s of stem 
shall be ___ or less and ___ or less, respectively. 
o Des~gn l~fe (analytically determined) by use of 
Goodman fatigue diagram shall be xlOY cycles using R= 
and average stress of ___ . 
o Surface finish of blade region shall not be greater 
than RMS. 
o Demonstrated ultimate factor of safety on monoton~c 
load~ng to failure at .005"/"/min shall be 
Basing these criteria on capabilities of existing, proven 
hardware establishes a performance base for future des~gns 
that can take advantage of new concepts or new materials 
while reducing the probability of structural problems. 
It is to be recognized, however, that an experimental 
and analytical effort is needed to develop the data base 
required for this approach. 
Summary: 
To summarize, without unduly regulating the development 
of implant des~gns, the establishment of design criteria 
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applicable to orthopedic implants could serve as an aid to 
improv1ng the devices by allow1ng mean1ngful engineer1ng 
comparisons between exist1ng designs and new designs taking 
advantage of improving technology. As voiced by many users 
of these dev1ces (orthopedic surgeons and researchers), the 
following is typical: 
"In summary, the h1stor1cal precedent 
1ndicates that specifications for surg1cal 
implants at the present time should and can 
be developed based on practical experience, 
w~thout wa~ting for a full sc~entific delin-
eation of the bas1c underlying phenomenon 
involved. The development of specifications 
is, ir. fact, currently in progress with1n 
ASTM F4; however, very little attention is 
being paid to performance; i.e., what works 
and what doesn't. 
The l~terature is replete with inves-
tigations dealing mainly w1th the problems 
of what does not work. It is essential, 
however, to exam~ne the other side of the 
coin as well; namely, what does work, and 
how do the two d~ffer. Defin~tive results 
can only be demonstrated through a compre-
hensive program of implant device retrieval 
and analysis." (Ref. 18 .) 
We agree with this ph11osophy. 
-26-
General: 
Mater~al Selection and Design 
Data Base 
As ~nd~cated, once the design function and general loads 
are developed and volumetric or other d~mens~onal l~mitations 
are satisf~ed, a structural shape is defined that can be 
stress analyzed to develop the material structural require-
ments. Selection of design data for the material requ~res 
that the crit~cal mechanical and physical properties must 
be identified. For example, mechanical strength <tensile 
ultimate, tensile or compressive y~eld, shear, etc.) may be 
important; fatigue life may be the design parameter. Perhaps 
modulus of elastic~ty or some physical property such as coef-
f~c~ent of thermal expansion, relat~onsh~p in galvan~c series 
to other alloys, or a number of other parameters may be im-
portant. Along with the definition of the property, the 
quality of the des~gn data must be cons~dered. Many of the 
properties are requ~red to be developed by careful test pro-
grams with statistically-derived des~gn values; others are 
inferred from relationships to other properties and even 
others are "average ll or IItypical" values. The needs for 
reliab1lity and the part cr~tical1ty determine, to a large 
extent, how the design values are selected. 
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Aerospace: 
W~thout doubt, the most widely used reference for alloy 
design allowables in aerospace designs is MIL-HDBK-S" Metallic 
Materials and Elemen~for Aerospace Veh~cle Structures" (Ref. 
19 ). Th~s handbook provides statist~cally-based design 
values for all of the major alloys in use in the aerospace 
industry. Mechanical strength values are reported as "A" 
allowables (99% nonexceedence with 9S% conf~dence) and "B" 
allowables (90% nonexceedence with 9S% conf~dence) based 
on a large experimental data base for the alloys and tempers. 
In addition to those properties normally used in design, 
other properties such as shear strength, bearing strength, 
modulus of elastic~ty and physical propert~es such as coef-
fic~ent of thermal expansion, specific heat, etc., are often 
also provided. 
An example of the sheets prov~ded for the aluminum alloy 
6061 is attached for information, Figures 2 , 3 , and Table 
3. While propert~es such as fatigue and fracture are not 
given statist~cal treatment, curves and data for these prop-
ert~es are given with d~scussion that appropriate precautions 
(design scatter factor, test environment, etc.) must be ob-
served in using these data for design purposes. 
The reliance on this document is indicated by the follow-
ing paragraphs from NASA SP-80S7 (Ref. 12 ) and JSC-SE-R-006 
(Ref. 20 ): 
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I I 
800 
TABLE 3260 (d) Dcslgn Uccha"lcal and Phll~lcal ['ropertlrs of GOGl 
Aillmlllllm AlIoII (Forgl1lgs) 
Alloy MIL-A-22i71, THe 6061 
--
Form DJeiolgmgs I Hand forgmgs a I 
Condition I 
-T6 and -T652 I -T6 
I I 
4001-
Thickness, In :S 4000 :S 4 000 8000 
BasIs A A I A 
Mechamcal properties 
I F'JI' kSI L 38 38 
I 
37 
I LT , 38 37 
ST 38 37 35 
F tv' kSI I I I 
L 35 I 35 I 34 
LT I 35 34 
ST 35 I 33 32 
Fr", h.Sl I L 36 36 35 
LT I 36 35 
ST 36 ! 34 33 
F,u' kSI 25 I 25 24 
F bru' kSI I I (cID=15) 61 I 61 59 
(cID=20) 76 76 74 
F brv , kSI ! 
(eID=15) 54 I 54 63 
(eID=20) 61 61 59 
e, per cent I 
I L 7 : 10 8 
LT 
1 
8 6 
ST 6 6 4 
E, 106 pSI 99 
E(, lOr. pSI 101 
G, 10c pSI 38 
P 033 
Physical Properties: 
Col,lb/m 3 0098 
C, Btu/(1b) (F) 023 (at 212 F) 
K, Btu/[ (hr) (W) (F) I 
ft] 96 (at 77F) 
Cl, lO-C m 1m IF 130 (68 to 212 F) 
G \1a"lmum cross-OI;('C'tlonal area 25C 6q 1n 
• For die rOTE'mgS thE' Land ST \aJu~ for thE" dlTE"C'tltlns parallel (v.lthln :!: If) degreoes) and not parallel (as d~e as pos!ubl. 
to the' ahort tr.nS\c:'rs~ dlrecbon) re--.)lf'<'tl\f'l). to thE" rOn~lnJl' flo,," lin"" 
T;'..BLE 3 
EY.N~PLE OF l"IL-HDBK-S DESIC-;N DATA ON ALU~lINUr1 PoLLOY 
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"4.7.2 ALLOWABLE MECHANICAL PROPERTIES 
Values for allowable mechan~cal proper-
ties of structure and jo~nts in their 
des~gn env~ronment (e.g., subjected to 
s~ngle stresses or combined stresses) 
shall be taken from sources approved 
by NASA, such as MIL-HDBK-5A, MIL-HDBK-17, 
and MIL-HDBK-23A. Where values for 
mechanical propert~es of new materials 
or jo~nts and for properties of existing 
mater~als or joints in new env~ronments 
are not available, they shall be deter-
mined by analyt~cal or test methods 
approved by NASA. Where tests are 
required, they shall be of sufficient 
number to establish values for the 
mechanical properties on a statistical 
basis, and the tests shall conform to 
procedures ~n MIL-HDBK-5A and AFML-TR-
66-386. Both 'A' (99 percent nonex-
ceedance with 95 percent confidence) 
and 'B' (90 percent nonexceedance with 
95 percent confidence) values for allow-
able stresses shall be provided. 
4.7.2.1 STRUCTURAL COMPONENT ALLOWABLES 
Mater~al 'A' allowable values shall be 
used in all applications where failure 
of a single load path would result in 
loss of structural integrity." 
2.7 MATERIAL ALLOWABLES 
"Structural material 'A' and 'B' allow-
abIes shall be determined to the sta-
tistical levels of MIL-HDBK-5. IS' 
allowables (specification allowables) 
may be used for materials ~n lieu of 
'A' and 'B' allowables where sufficient 
industry data do not ex~st to meet 
all the requirements of 'A' and 'B' 
allowables, and lot-to-lot test~ng 
is a specification requirement. Pro-
grams for the development of new allow-
abIes requiring the generation of 
significant amounts of test data requ~re 
the review and approval of NASA." 
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Certainly, companies develop their own design handbooks 
which may reflect properties negotiated with the supplier 
but ~n general, values for aerospace pr~mary structures 
require the statistical treatment outlined in the referenc-
ed document. With the tremendous number of fabricators, 
machine shops, heat treat fac~lities, etc., ~nvolved in 
making elements of a modern-day aircraft, the designer must 
be assured that properties of material procured to a speci-
fication, processed in accordance with a specification w~ll 
yield material in a part w~th reliable strength meet~ng the 
needs of the hardware. 
For example, a titanium part design ~n an a~rcraft would 
typically reference the material specification (MIL-T-9046), 
heat treated per MIL-H-8l200, nondestructively evaluated per 
the requirements of MIL-I-6870 or MIL-I-8950 and further 
defined by specif~cations concerning welding, plating, or 
other processes as applicable. Again, company specifications 
are recognized alternatives but usually must be approved 
by the customer or procuring agency before acceptance to 
insure that these company documents meet or exceed the 
Government specifications. Conformance to these requirements 
~s usually required by the contract or detailed, negotiated 
end-item specifications. 
Several years ago, the Apollo program encountered a 
rash of test failures caused by unexpected reactions of alloys 
with fluids and gases while the alloy was stressed. Wh~le 
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most of the failures were identified as caused by stress 
corrOSlon cracking, the ensuing testing led to increased 
knowledge of environmentally-assisted flaw growth. The data 
base in this field has expanded significantly through the large 
test programs conducted by companles, Government, and prlvate 
research organizations. As an example, it has been demon-
strated that many test enVlronments can cause rapid growth 
of small flaws resident in the material while other fluids 
or environments can both create and propagate flaws while 
the alloy is subJected to mechanical loads. The signlficance 
of this is that the design allowable or structural capability 
must be examined in llght of the use environment. 
Evaluation in the laboratory can be deceptive ln that 
test varlables must duplicate use conditions closely. A 
minor variation in fluid or gas composltlon, temperature, 
flow rate, stress level, materlal strength level, etc., can 
greatly affect the test results. As a result of this hlgh 
degree of specificity wlth some alloys and some environments, 
drastic steps were often used in the Apollo program. For 
example, each shipment of propellant (nitrogen tetroxide) 
flown in the Apollo program not only met the speclfication 
but a sample was tested in contact wlth a stressed, pre-
cracked speclmen of the flight tank contalner alloy (6AL-4V 
titanium alloy) to insure that adverse flaw growth would 
not occur with that load of propellant. While this repre-
sents an extreme, its message is that high reliability structures 
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cannot be designed using design allowables developed in a 
"ben1gn" environment and subsequently used in an "aggressive" 
environment; oft times, the "aggressive" environments are 
no more than moist, industrial air. Examples of degradat10n 
of h1gh efficiency alloys from various "benign" environments 
are 1llustrated 1n the following: 
Test Material: 300 M steel 
Test Conditions: Precracked samples, stressed to 75,000 
psi (84% of air failure strength). 
Test Environment Fa1lure Time, Minutes 
Record1ng Ink 0.5 
Distilled Water 6.5 
Acetone 120 
Lubr1cat1ng Oil 150 
Carbon Tetrachloride No failure in 1280 minutes 
Air No failure in 6000 minutes 
Ref. E. H. Phelps, u.s. Steel, "A Review of the Stress 
Corrosion Behavior of Steels with H1gh Yield 
Strengths. II 
Test Material: Ti 6Al-4V, solution treated and aged 
weld areas. 
Test Cond1t1ons: Tension-tension fatiguing 6 cpm, smooth 
specimen, 7 to 140 KSI. 
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Test Environment Cycles to Failure 
Air 1385 
Distilled Water 1269 
Dry Methyl Alcohol 86-91 
Ref. NASA TN D-3868, "Stress Corrosion Crack~ng of Ti 
6Al-4V Alloy in Methanol," February 1967. 
Add~t~onal data of th~s type are found in the "Analysis" 
discussion of the report. 
To illustrate the type of tests performed in the Apollo 
program, a fatigue-precracked sample of the alloy (Ti 6Al-4V) 
was stressed while in contact with the fluids. If failure 
did not occur in less than 100 hours, the metal sample was 
taken out of test, fatigue tested to deepen the crack and 
then pulled to failure in tension. By examination of the 
fracture surface, one could see if sustained load flaw growth 
had occurred (growth between fatigue bands) or if no growth 
had occurred (one cont~nuous band of fatigue growth). By 
varying stress and flaw dimensions to yield var~ous stress 
intensity levels, a stress intens~ty value below wh~ch flaw 
growth for that alloy ~n that fluid will not occur was es-
tablished and was defined as a KTH. Var~ous fluids and gases 
were tested and some flu~ds were found to cause flaw extension 
in this alloy at very low stress intensities. An example 
of the type of curves developed is seen in F~gure 4 and 
tabulated data in Table 4. 
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These data were used to set a "use" level of fracture 
mechanics stress ~ntensity based on proof testing or NDT 
setting an initial flaw size, thereby providing a des~gn 
stress that would preclude sustained load flaw growth 1ead-
ing to failure in the application. 
Sim~lar1y, flaw growth data can be developed in fluids 
or gases and the growth due to sustained load, cyclic load, 
or combinations can be determined. Such approaches may be 
found ~n NASA-SP-8040 (Ref. 21), ASTM-STP-381 (Ref.22 ), 
or numerous references in the l~terature on fracture mechanics 
and fracture control. 
These approaches, developed for the Apollo program are 
also used ~n the Space Shuttle fracture control program. 
The Department of Defense, many nuclear power plant design 
groups, and other industr~es requiring maximum reliability 
and safety from hardware are developing or are uS1ng s1m~lar 
fracture control procedures. 
Orthopedic Implants: 
As a method of introducing the subject, a br~ef h1stor~-
cal summary of medical metals ~s c~ted: 
"The History of Medical Metals 
What is the best metal to implant 
into humans? The answer to that problem 
has changed over the years and will 
probably cont~nue to change. The ear-
liest wr~tten record on the med~ca1 use 
of metal occurred in the year 1546 when 
Ambroise Par'e described the use of gold 
~n surgical procedures. The f1rst known 
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case of iron wire being used for bone 
repair was performed in 1775. In 1829, 
the first scientlfic study was conduct-
ed to determine which type of metallic 
wire should be used. It was concluded 
that of all the known metals and alloys 
of the day, platinum was the least irri-
tatinq. Lister, who did much of the 
pioneering work in developing sterile 
techniques, also performed operations 
with silver wire implants. Durino this 
period of history, a mistake was occa-
sionally made--that of usinq one metal 
for the plate and a quite different one 
for the screw. One surgeon reported that, 
durinq an operation on the upper arm 
bone, every time he touched a brass 
screw to an alu~inum plate, the hand of 
the patient contracted. Another surgeon 
once used a maqnesium plate and a steel 
screw. After several months in a follow-
up operation to remove the plate and screw, 
the doctor found that the implants had 
completely dissolved." (REF. 23.) 
Certainly, much improvement was needed and much has been 
achieved! Development of test methods to evaluate biocompati-
bility allowed evaluation of newer materials with improved 
corroslon resistance and higher mechanical propertles that are 
accepted by the human body. 
In 1962, the American Society For Testing and Materials 
created a co~ittee (F4) to establish standards for medlcal 
and surgical materials. 
Today, there are standards covering the alloys in use 
that provide levels of acceptability in terms of physical, 
mechanical, and chemical characteristics. In addltion, there 
are tentative standards for radiographic inspection and other 
processes such as liquid penetrant inspection of devices 
for surface defects. A partial listing of the specifications 
and compositions of the alloys is found in Table 5. 
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I 
.c:. 
o 
I 
ALLOY TYPE 
316L SS 
Cast Co-Cr-Mo 
Ti 6Al-4V 
Co-Cr-W-Ni 
Co-Ni-Cr-Mo 
ASTM MAJOR CONSTITUENTS (WT. %) I 
SPECIFICATION C'r Ni Fe' Co Mo i'1 Ti Al V 
F 55-76, F 138-76 ) 17-20 12-14 Ba1 2-4 
F 621-79, F 56-76,) , 
F 139-76 ) 
F 75-76 27-30 Ba1 5-7 
F 136-79 Ba1 5.5-6.5 3.5-4.5 
F 90-76 19-21 9-11 Ba1 14-16 
F 562-78 19-21 33-37 Ba1 9.5-
10.5 
\ 
TABLE "5 
SPECIFICATIONS AND COMPOSITIONS OF THF. MAJOR IMPLANT ALLOYS 
. 
! 
" 
Methods of fabrication vary with manufacturer but most 
can be summarized below: 
o Forging of shapes followed by steps such as, machin-
ing, heat treatment, and chemical f1nishing. 
o Cast1ng of shapes followed by steps such as, mach1n-
ing, heat treatment and chemical fin1shing. 
o Mach1ning from bar, plate, sheet, or str1p. 
o Form1ng from wire, sheet, or strip. 
Each of these processes 1S subject to var1at10ns 1n the 
industrial manufacturers' plants or in suppliers' processes. 
In fact, the basic ASTM specif1cations can really only pro-
vide the requirements for the raw mater1al; subsequent opera-
t10ns such as cold-form1ng, heat treat1ng, or hot forg1ng 
can affect all of the properties described in the ASTM spec-
1f1cations. The propert1es and characteristics of the f1n-
1shed parts depend greatly on the steps needed to convert 
from raw material to finished product. For example, titanium 
alloys are well known to be 1mbrittled by the accidental 
add1t10n of 1nterstitial elements such as carbon, nltrogen, 
hydrogen, oxygen, etc. Improper thermal or chemlcal treat-
ments can drastically affect the durability and fracture 
behavior of these alloys. Having control over the raw mate-
rial w1thout control over the subsequent manufactur1ng processes 
assures only that the starting material is correct--assurance 
of part process1ng and subsequent metallurglcal character-
istics rests wlth the manufacturers and their subcontractors. 
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The literature dealing wlth the materials problems in 
metallic orthopedic implants is voluminous and controversial. 
Cahoon and Paxton are quoted as (Ref. 3 ): 
" A number of stalnless steel and 
V1tallium orthopedic lmplants were 
purchased from the manufacturers and 
analyzed to determine their metallur-
glcal soundness. From thlS sampling 
of current orthopedic implants over 
50% contain metallurgical defects and 
def1ciencles sim1lar to those which 
have been shown previously to cause 
failures. " 
Numerous reports (Ref. 3 38 , and 41 ) c1te casting 
porosity, segregation, excesslvely large grain Slze and im-
proper heat treatment as contribut1ng to fa1lures of metal-
lic implants. Most of these citations are for devices made 
5-10 years ago and manufacturers are quick to p01nt out that 
sign1flcant 1mprovements have been made in that interim. 
One recent (1980) paper by Ducheyne, et al., cites the role 
of casting defects (voids) in lim1t1ng part life; however, 
the source and date of part manufacture are not given. 
The use of ASTM spec1f1cat1ons to control raw mater1al 
quality and properties 1S an excellent approach. However, 
one must look with cr1tical scrutiny at what 1S controlled 
and what 1S not controlled. 
There are no ASTM specifications available, for example, 
to assure proper heat treatment or restrict10ns on some chemical 
processes that could adversely affect performance of the fin-
ished orthopedic implant parts; also, all strength levels 
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being used in hardware are not covered by the existing speci-
fications. 
Perhaps one of the biggest concerns in the implant data 
base for alloys lies in the unava11ab11ity of estab11shed 
design allowables for key properties like fat1gue or flaw 
growth thresholds 1n body fluids. 
Without question, the single most predominant failure 
mechan1sm cited in the literature for h1p 1mplants is fatigue 
and corrosion-ass1sted fat1gue. Attempts to find uniform 
or fatigue design allowables used by manufacturers or designers 
were basically futile. There are numerous articles 1n the 
l1terature that d1scuss fat1gue behav10r of 1mplant alloys 
when tested in air uS1ng a variety of test spec1men designs 
and test methods. What is disconcert1ng 1S that there appears 
to be no authoritative fat1gue or fracture mechanics values 
on these alloys to be used in 11fe analyses. One very ex-
cellent article by Miller, Rostoker, and Galante (Ref. 24 ) 
prov1des the methodology for such an approach in an article 
entitled "A Stat1stical Treatment of Fat1gue of the Cast 
Co-Cr-Mo Prothesis Alloy" but their summary contains the 
disappointing statement that "These results are va11d for 
substantially sounder material than may be common 1n com-
mercial use and therefore a more conservative allowable stress 
probably ought to be used for design purposes." 
In addition, fat1gue strength can be 1nfluenced by the 
test environment, both mechanical and chemical aspects. 
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Basically, two classes of fatigue data are reported; data 
from smooth or notched specimens and crack growth data using 
precracked fatigue specimens. Both types of data on implant 
alloys showed eV1dence of env1ronmental effects. 
Using the basic crack growth relationship of Paris, 
(da/dN=C(~K)n), Colangelo (Ref. 25 ) tested and analyzed type 
316 SMO stainless steel from implants in a1r and 1n 0.9% 
NaCl solution. The results, illustrated in Figure 5 show 
the effect of the environment which was to increase the crack 
growth rate in the salt solution over the rate obtained in 
air. As noted by Colangelo, the rate of cycling can affect 
the results and his work was conducted at 30 cycles/second, 
rather fast for typical frequenc1es encountered 1n use. 
Similarly, Wheeler and James (Ref. 26 ) tested type 
316 sta1nless steel in Ringer's solution and 1n a1r uS1ng 
a different spec1men design and at 50 cycles-per-minute and 
obtained the data 1n Figure 6. Again, the effects of the 
body-type fluid is to increase crack growth rates. 
Bowers (Ref. 27 ) reported the data in Figure 7 show-
ing smooth specimen data on type 316 stainless steel and 
"titanium" tested in a1r and 1n R1nger's solution at 50 cpm 
and 1700 cpm. The effects of test environment and test1ng 
speed are obvious. 
Interestingly enough, a recent article by Piehler and 
Slater (Ref. 28) on legal and regulatory implications of 
implant retrieval and analysis cites fatigue data on 3l6L 
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stainless and 6 AI-4V Titanium in Ringer's solution (Figure 
8) on Jewett Nails. Their observations are: 
"The difference in performance of 
these devices is striking and certa~nly 
suggests that Ti 6AI 4V should be g~ven 
serious attention as an implant material. 
S~nce loads appl~ed to retrieved implants 
are v~rtually unknown, this superior 
performance of Ti 6AI 4V, if it trans-
lates ~nto ~mproved in v~vo performance, 
would have taken years to observe from 
analyses of retrieved implants. 
Whereas the authors recognize that 
th~s corrosion-fatigue performance test 
does not simulate every aspect of in v~vo 
performance, ~t nevertheless appears ~ 
be a valuable in~tial step. S~nce the 
test is new and not widely proven, its 
adoption by the BMD as a performance 
standard ~s premature, if appropriate 
at all. However, ~ts adoption as a 
regulatory guidel~ne seems to make sense 
to us. In fact, many of the standards 
already in existence would appear to be 
prime candidates for recognition as reg-
ulatory guidelines. It would appear to 
us that prudent manufacturers would ad-
here to these gu~del~nes, and this proce-
dure would circumvent the difficult~es 
involved with the endorsement of stan-
dards or mandatory performance-standard 
development. " 
It appears from the preponderance of literature on the 
subJect, that the characterization of mater~als and the con-
trol of material in fabricated hardware is cited as an area 
for improvement. 
The work cited by Wheeler and James on Annealed 316 
stainless steel in Ringer's solution represents the NASA-
Shuttle approach to developing safe operating stress levels 
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1 
EJ+ 
for critical hardware using pre-cracked specimens tested 
under load while in contact with the flulds to be encountered 
in use. 
Also, using pre-cracked specimens the flaw growth-per-
cycle (da/dN) developed while ln contact with the fluid can 
be developed for life determinations. These approaches have 
been shown to dlscrlmlnate between materlals performance 
and strength levels withln a material system where smooth 
or arbltrarlly notched speclmens do not. 
Based on the information in the literature, there are 
several potential sites ln implants for flaws from manufac-
turlng or from installation (nicks or gouges from lnstrurnents 
used to lnstall the implant). These sites can grow under 
stress or as a result of load cycling untll failure occurs. 
The methods of fracture mechanics can be used to calculate 
part life lf the correct materlals data are available and 
if load conditions can be predicted. Examples of methods 
and uses of this approach are found in NASA-SP-8040 and in 
ASTM-STP-384. Development of appropriate materials behavlor 
in body fluids is a necessary element of such an analysis. 
If new alloys or strength levels are to be utilized 
to upgrade the performance of orthopedic lmplants, proper 
methods for comparing performance of current alloys with 
new materials or conditions should be established. Corro-
Slon tests, fatigue strength and flaw growth characteristics 
in simulated body fluids could be extremely helpful in 
-49-
comparlng performance if uniform tests are used for the mate-
rials being evaluated. 
Recommendations from ASTM or NASA on standardized test 
methods would be helpful; many existing standards can be 
evaluated for applicability to this problem. 
Summary: 
Use of ASTM specifications can provlde adequate control 
of raw material propertles and chemical composltlon. Thermal 
or thermo-mechanical processes used in fabrlcating lmplants 
can affect the strength of the products and result ln varia-
tions in structural capability from different producers even 
in the same implant design. Control of these processes by 
ASTM-type specifications could provide more consistency in 
the flnished products. 
Establishment of handbook-type data for mechanlcal proper-
tles including fatigue life would lntroduce addltional product 
consistency and rellablllty of structural capabllity. 
For those devices operating ln body fluids, the allow-
abIes should be based on the critlcal deslgn parameter deve-
loped in slmulated body fluids. Aerospace-generated test 
techniques and analytical tools are avallable for use lf 
requlred loads and stress analyses are avallable for the 
implant designs to use ln llfe calculatlons. 
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Analysis Methods 
General: 
The discussion of methods for analyzing high criticality 
structures begins with the same point as discussed prev~ously. 
The methods all requ~re some knowledge of loads and load 
spectra as an ~nitial input; after that, the methods of han-
dling the loads and lifetime requirements differ greatly 
from industry-to-~ndustry. Simple, stra~ght-forward stress 
analysis of structures using formulae from standard references 
like Roark (Ref. 29 ) and Timoshenko (Ref. 30) are the methods 
used in most industries but as part criticality and load 
complexity increase, the rigor and methodolog~es lead to 
the use of automated methods and finite-element computer 
programs to process the needed data quickly and improve the 
internal load-determination process. 
Aerospace: 
In general, loads involved in aerospace components are 
complex in that many loads from different sources can act 
on the structure during different time domains ~n use. As 
a result, the use of computer programs has become commonly 
accepted as the method of provid~ng the final loads and stress 
data. In preliminary design and during the ~nitial veh~cle 
sizing, s~mplified analyses are performed and several itera-
tions of increasing complexity follow as addit~onal input 
data just~fy. 
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The use of h1gh-speed electron1c dig1tal computers al-
lowed the structural engineer to utilize standard matrix 
structural analysis methods applied to complex problems 1n-
volving continuous geometries by a set of interconnected 
f1nite elements of known character1st1cs. Analysis of the 
elements, superimposing element solut10ns to develop the 
solution for complex systems, and the overall capab11ity to 
develop detailed elements of a size cons1stent with system 
needs have all led to a very rapidly increasing use of com-
puter programs ava11able to every technical field. Prolif-
erat10n of these programs, availability of computers (even 
time-shar1ng), and the proven value of these methods have 
led to an extremely popular approach to solv1ng structural 
mechanics problems. 
Aerospace has adopted the use of finite element programs 
in a routine manner to solve structural, thermal, and com-
bined environment programs. Typical of the general-purpose 
programs available 1n most computer centers are listed in 
Table 6. More complete lists of available programs may 
be obtained in the literature, from computer centers, or 
from NASA (see also Ref. 31-36). 
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Table 6 
Part~al List of Available 
F~nite Element Computer Programs 
1. NASTRAN (NASA Structural Analysis) 
2. STRESS II 
3. STRATA (Stress and Thermal Analysis) 
4. ANSYS (Engineering Analysis System) 
5. STARDYNE 
6. SPACE 
7. SAP IV 
Many aerospace organizat~ons have chosen to develop 
a fracture control program to apply to those few components 
that are absolutely required to perform reliably. The frac-
ture control program is both a management and a hardware 
control system that requ~res integrated evaluations of stress, 
materials, manufacturing, and quality assurance. As an ex-
ample of the selection logic used to determ~ne which parts 
must conform to th~s rigor, F~gure 9 is taken from the 
Space Shuttle Orb~ter Fracture Control Plan (Ref 47). As seen 
~n the f~gure, the f~rst "crossroad" ~dent~fy~ng a part that 
can "cause loss of veh~cle" screens the large maJority of 
structure so that the additional steps only apply to the 
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most critical elements. The use of highly sensitive and 
well-mon1tored nondestructive evaluation (NDE) opt1ons or 
limited llfe "redlines" can prevent redesign but most parts 
must show greater than four times the vehicle life when an-
alyzed using fracture mechanics analytical programs. 
An 1ntegral part of the fracture control program is the 
fracture mechan1cs analysis. To perform the analys1s, a 
good stress analys1s 1S needed along with the proper material 
character1st1cs (toughness, flaw growth rates, env1ronmental 
effects, etc.). 
Although the fracture mechan1cs approach 1S often cr1t-
icized for being conservative in assumptions (worst Slze, 
or1entation of flaw, plane stra1n toughness for thin material, 
etc.), analys1s show1ng adequate life has been successful 
1n cr1t1cal applicat1ons. The Department of Defense and 
NASA have been the most-often cited users of fracture mechan-
ics, but the users of these approaches are rap1dly find1ng 
appl1cat1ons in d1verse industries such as offshore struc-
tures, pipelines, nuclear components, rotating mach1nery, 
and transportation systems. The techniques (computer models, 
stress intens1ty solutions) are available and a single ex-
ample of life and damage tolerance considerat1ons is 1ncluded 
1n Append1x A. Interest1ngly enough, the report from Wh1Ch 
the mater1al 1n Appendix A is taken includes case histories 
of the uses of fracture mechanics in diverse areas such as 
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ra~lway rail failures, ship hydraulic equipment, and a ski-
l~ft chain failure. Certainly, it is not an exaggeration to 
say that the application of fracture mechanics is no longer 
considered "too expensive" or "too complex" for any but aero-
space. 
Orthopedic Implants: 
It ~s encouraging to note that fin~te element stress 
models are being used by investigators ~n the orthopedic 
implant field. A femoral stem implanted ~n the femur is a 
complex structure involving a system composed of bone, ad-
hesive and metal components; loads and load spectra are 
h~ghly variable. Therefore, these complex cond~t~ons pre-
clude simpler methods, and require material propert~es and 
load assumptions that may not be ent~rely available or reli-
able. Therefore, knowledge of the input data may lim~t the 
usability of the output. Nevertheless, work by Andriacch~, 
et al., using a two-dimensional representation of the femur, 
implant stem and cement did perform a finite element stress 
analysis and compared the results with instrumented prosthe-
sis cemented into wet embalmed cadaver femora. The results 
of analyses and experimental tests as a function of other 
variables are shown in Figures lO(a) and (b) (Ref. 37). 
Wh~le three-dimensional models are desired, these sim-
plif~ed results are very enlighten~ng ~n develop~ng stress 
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levels along the stem length and relative sensitivities of 
some of the assumptions of materials properties on the f~nal 
results. 
On the negative side, a recent survey by the Food and 
Drug Administrat~on asking some of the leading workers in 
the implant f~eld about needed data on orthopedic implants 
prior to invest~gat~onal evaluation in humans resulted in 
only 22% of the responders stating a des~re for "determina-
tion of stresses and deformations in the device" and only 
11% stating that there is a need for "finite element method 
of analysis or other numerical techniques." Over 44% felt 
that empirical determinations were su~fic~ent (Ref. 40 ). 
Indeed, if the general attitude in the industry is to 
rely on compar~son and use history, then developing rigor 
~n other areas of design and development ~s inconsistent 
and may be unnecessary. One would hope that the continued 
broadening of uses of ~mproved analytical methods will il-
lustrate the desirabil~ty and s~mplicity of the methods to 
this industry. Use of experimental data as methods of im-
proving analyt~cal models will always be desirable but quan-
t~tative methods of analyzing designs can lead to greater 
inslghts lnto design improvements with much more hope for 
understanding and improvement. 
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Summary: 
The analytical methods and procedures in use by aero-
space appear to be very applicable to the orthopedic 1mplant 
des1gn and analys1s procedure. BaS1C loads data would have 
to be developed for each specific appl1cation with suffic1ent 
understand1ng to just1fy the rigorous analysis, but th1s 
should be possible with the exist1ng information from pre-
vious and current studies. 
The use of fracture mechan1cs analysis requires a mate-
rials data base that is not apparent for the orthoped1c 1m-
plant alloys but the technique of treating flaws 1n struc-
tures emanating from fastener holes, manufacturing defects, 
raw material defects, or those that develop in use is cer-
ta1nly one that could prov1de a safe life determ1nation. 
Certainly, cont1nued evaluation of fin1te element stress 
analyses as a way of examining part stress and stra1n dis-
tribution would provide sign1f1cant insight into expected 
use cond1tions and life calculations. For those orthopedic 
implants where maX1mum reliability and performance are needed, 
the stress analysis is vital 1n the same way that the stress 
analysis is the cornerstone of the life calculation in aero-
space components. 
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Inspection/Acceptance Methods 
Aerospace: 
In addition to the usual dimensional and other visual 
checks required in parts manufactured to aerospace designs, 
nondestructive testing (NDT) is also required to an extent 
specified on the design drawings. Control of the NDT pro-
cess is effected through manufacturer-wr1tten specif1cat10ns, 
plans, and design draw1ngs. One widely used Mi11tary Speci-
fication wh1ch establishes such procedures is MIL-I-6870C, 
a copy of which is included as Append1x C. Much of the pre-
sent descr1pt10n is taken from this document. 
The nondestruct1ve testing plan for each manufacturer 
1S implemented and monitored by a review board comprised 
of des1gn analysis, manufactur1ng, and NDT representat1ves. 
The selection of this review board is subject to the approval 
of the Government contracting agency. The functions of these 
three representatives are as follows: 
IlDes1gn analysis representat1ve(s). 
The design analysis representative shall 
provide the board information and data 
on the acceptable lim1ts of defects in 
the materials and parts under considera-
tion. This shall include part configura-
tion, acceptable defect size, critical 
locations and or1entations, and primary 
stress conditions and directions. 
Manufacturing representative(s). 
The manufacturing representative(s) shall 
provide the board information and data on 
the stages and limitations of process1ng, 
manufacturing and assembly at which non-
destructive testing can be achieved. This 
shall include information and data on 
access1bility, surface finish, or other 
conditions which may influence inspect-
ability. 
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Nondestruct1ve testing repre-
sentat1ve(s). The nondestructive 
test1ng representative(s) shall pro-
vide the board information and data 
on the sensitivity and applicability 
of NDT techniques for the defect 
sizes, locations and orientations, 
part geometries, and materials being 
considered." 
The following classes representing the functional reli-
ab111ty of the material or part have been estab11shed: 
Class 1 - Components wh1ch are fracture or fatigue 
cr1t1cal or components the s1ngle 
fa11ure of which would cause significant 
danger to operating personnel or would 
result 1n an operational penalty. Th1S 
1ncludes loss of major components, loss 
of control, un1ntentional release, inab11-
1ty to release armament stores, or fa11ure 
of weapon installation components. 
Class 1A - A Class 1 component, the single failure of 
wh1ch would result 1n the loss of an a1r-
craft or missile system. 
Class 1B - Class 1 components not 1ncluded 1n Class 1A. 
Class 2 - All components not classified as Class 1. 
Class 2A - Components having a margin of safety of 200 
percent or less. 
Class 2B - Components having a marg1n of safety greater 
than 200 percent. 
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In addition to the above classes, components are often 
assigned a grade which is defined in terms of defect s~ze, 
location, type, and frequency wh~ch are acceptable. 
Note that many of the surgical implants considered ~n 
th~s report would l~kely fall in Class 1. 
" Specific inspection requ~rements 
must be made for all Class 1 mater~als 
and parts. The act~on shall include ... 
the design requ~rements of acceptable 
defect size, critical locations and 
or~entation, primary stress cond~tions 
and directions. The manufactur~ng 
recornrnendat~on for point of testing, 
and the specif~cat~on of NDT technique 
and sensitiv~ty. " (Para 3.3.3.1) 
This information is required on all engineering and 
production draw~ngs of Class 1 parts. In add~tion, on 
" .•. mater~als and parts in wh~ch the 
grade level varies with location, the 
drawing shall be zoned and the appro-
pr~ate informat~on ... shall be entered 
for each zone. (Para 3.3.4.3)" 
Test procedures for Class 1 parts shall include: 
a. Spec~fic part number and conf~guration. 
b. Stage of fabr~cat~on. 
c. Surface finish and part preparation. 
d. Manufacturer and model number of all instrumenta-
tion to be used. 
e. F~xturing requirements. 
f. Manufacturer and identif~cation of all testing 
materials. 
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g. Detailed procedure steps or reference to company 
process specif)cat~on procedure if applicable. 
h. Calibration and standardization procedure. 
i. Acceptance and evaluation procedure. 
J. Precaut~ons ~n use of test procedure. 
k. Drawings of the part to be tested with ~dentifica­
tion of areas to be tested and the direction and magnitude 
of primary stresses. 
1. Physical descr~ption of probable defects. 
m. Minimum acceptable defect size and orientat~on. 
n. Lim~tat~ons of techn~que ~n defect sens~tivity. 
o. Sources of noise signals and their identifications. 
p. Procedures for retesting by the same or alternate 
methods to provide adequate confidence level. 
Table 7 lists the common NDT methods currently in use 
showing the properties being sensed, the flaws detected, 
the~r application, advantages, disadvantages (Ref. 43 ). 
Note that x-ray radiography, liquid penetrants, eddy current 
testing, and magnet~c particle testing are all capable of 
detecting surface cracks. Ward D. Rummel, et al., of Martin-
Marietta under NASA contract NAS9-l4653 performed an inves-
t~gation to determine the reliability of trained operators, 
using these techniques, to detect t~ghtly closed cracks of 
known dimensions and locations. Two alloys were used in 
this study, 4340 steel and Ti 6Al-4V. 
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In this study fatlgue cracks were lntentionally lntro-
duced in test samples at known locatlons. The starter notches 
were then removed by machinlng. The samples were cleaned 
and inspected by the above techniques using three independ-
ent, experienced and dependable NDT personnel. There were 
176 fatigue cracks ln 60 steel speclmens and 13S fatlgue 
cracks in 60 titanium alloy specimens. The cracks were ran-
domly located wlth a range of sizes and shapes USlng both 
sides of the test plates. After this flrst sequence of tests 
the surfaces were etched to remove about O.OOOS-inch of metal 
from each surface and the llquid penetrant test repeated. 
Finally, the panels were proof loaded to 80% of the material 
Yleld strength except for the thinner of the tltanlum panels 
which were proof loaded to 90% of the yield strength. They 
were then relnspected for cracks using all of the above methods. 
At the concluslon of all the NDT inspections the cracks 
were broken open in bending and measured. Flnally, statls-
tical correlations were performed to determine the probabllity 
of finding cracks of various dimensions. 
The most reliable method for Ti 6Al-4V was the liquid-
penetrant test and the least reliable was the x-radiographic 
method. Figures 11 and 12 show the results of these two 
methods. For the llquld-penetrant method note that etchlng 
the machined surface improved the sensltivity but that proof 
loading had little effect. Note also that the probability 
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of finding cracks shorter than 0.1 1nch decreases dramati-
cally as crack length decreases. In other words, the best 
ava1lable inspection technique is llkely to m1SS any crack 
shorter than 0.10 inch 1n T1 6Al-4V. 
For the steel spec1mens llqU1d penetrant and magnetic 
particle methods were about equally effective, with the other 
techniques showing lower sensitivity. The final conclUS1on 
is slmilar to that for titanium, i.e., that after inspect10n 
and elimination of all parts in which defects are detected 
the best that one can say is that the remaining parts have 
no defects longer than about 0.1 1nch. 
Orthoped1c Implants: 
From our questions and site v1sits, it appears that there 
1S no uniform authority govern1ng inspect10n of orthoped1c 
implants equivalent to MIL-I-6870C. The implant manufactur-
ers questioned e1ther used the ASTM Standards directly as 
spec1fications or wrote their own internal spec1f1cations 
based upon the ASTM Standards and on aerospace/military docu-
ments. Only two specifications are currently published, ASTM 
F 601-78 dealing with fluorescent penetrant 1nspection and 
F 629-79 dealing with radiography. 
W1th the larger manufacturers, inspection begins at 
the receiving dock where each batch of incoming parts or 
material is inspected. This inspection generally consists 
of mass-spectrographic analysis to verify the alloy compos1t1on, 
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and metallography to ver~fy the microstructure. Smaller 
manufacturers do not perform such tests on site. Visual 
inspection is performed throughout manufacture. In the case 
of total hip prostheses and presumably na~l plates and bone 
plates a dye penetrant test ~s performed to check for cracks. 
One manufacturer performed proof tests on hip prostheses for 
a per~od of a year but quit this test because it did not 
screen any flaws. F~nal ~nspection is v~sual. D~mens~ons 
are checked, surface finish is observed for evidence of pitting, 
scratches, undetected cracks, etc. 
From a fracture mechanics v~ewpoint the ability or ~n­
ability of an inspection method to f~nd flaws of a given 
nature is signif~cant informat~on to the design and analysis 
of a device. The size, shape, and location of undetected 
flaws combined w~th the load spectra on the device are used 
to pred~ct the flaw growth rates and hence the life of the 
device. Thus it is important to know the sensit~vity of 
any method being used to inspect for flaws. The only way 
that this can be done with confidence is by the use of stan-
dards s~m~lar to those used in the Rummel, et al., study 
cited above. In the case of castings where porosity or ~n­
clusions are likely to promote crack in~tiat~on, standards 
must be prepared w~th these type of defects of varying s~zes, 
shapes, and orientations in material of similar s~ze and 
shape to the part to be inspected. Only by the use of such 
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standards can a manufacturer know that the method of inspec-
tion which is being used is capable of screening out those 
flaws which his design and analysis say will degrade the 
performance of the device. If it turns out that the methods 
be1ng used are incapable of screening flaws with the requ1red 
sens1tiv1ty then other methods of NOT should be investigated. 
Referring again to the Rummel, et al., study, note 1n 
Figure 11 that the dye penetrant test was made more reliable 
by an etch procedure. Whether the same is true after an 
electrolyt1c polish 1S not known. Buffing or mechan1cal 
polishing operations are commonly employed 1n making lIDplants. 
Whether and to what extent these operat1ons influence the 
sensitiv1ty of a dye-penetrant test could eas11y be deter-
mined with a series of samples similar to those used by 
Rummel, et ale 
The only methods of NOT 1n use by orthoped1c manufac-
turers to our knowledge are x-rad1ography and dye penetrant. 
As was shown in Table 6 many other techniques eX1st w1th 
their own advantages and lim1tations. The use of these should 
be investigated using the appropriate standards to make sure 
that the optimum technique for each deV1ce is indeed being 
used. 
As noted above, the Rummel, et al., study showed that 
no technique could reveal t1ghtly closed cracks smaller than 
0.1 inch long. Another difficult NOT task is to find small 
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subsurface poros1ty and 1ncluS1ons by x-rad1ography. A method 
which should be investigated as a solution to these problems 
is the combined use of acoustic em1ssion and a proof test. 
It 1S known that propagat1ng cracks em1t high frequency sound 
pulses as they move, and these can be detected with the proper 
equ1pment. By applY1ng this equipment to a dev1ce be1ng 
loaded wlth forces similar to those to be encountered in 
serV1ce, it has been shown that one can locate any flaws 
which are of the necessary orientation and dimens10ns to 
propagate under such loading. This test thus shows promise 
of screen1ng precisely those flaws which would be of concern 
to the funct10ning of the dev1ce. 
In any manufacturing effort, fa1lure analysis is a poten-
tially valuable tool for identifY1ng trouble spots whether 
they be 1n inspection, des1gn, manufacture, or operat1on. 
The 1mplant companies quest10ned are all engaged 1n fa1lure 
analyses. Many other groups have collected data on perform-
ance, 1n some instances looking for metallurgical problems 
(Ref.4, 8, 18), sometimes looking for biomedical problems 
(Ref. 44), sometimes looking for a var1ety of problems 
(Ref. 45 ). It would appear that such efforts would all 
profit from coordination among each other. Because of the 
large number of these dev1ces be1ng implanted continually, 
because of the variety of manufacturers, deslgns, and mate-
rials being used,because of the large number of surgeons 
using them, and because of the importance of each device 
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to the pat~ent in which it ~s ~planted early warn~ng of 
any problem would appear to be of great importance. There-
fore, it appears worth recommending that a continuing retr~ev­
al program of removed dev~ces be established with all the 
necessary data be~ng collected on each retrieval. The deve-
lopment of th~s program should ~nclude the entire spectrum 
of users of such ~nformation. 
Summary: 
The contrast, as noted before in this report, between 
a central large-customer-or~ented ~nspect~on requirement 
and an ind~vidual manufacturer-or~ented-inspect~on requ~re­
ment ~s obvious. Considering that customers for ~mplants 
are individual surgeons with little or no interest ~n or 
access to NOT spec~alists and qual~ty control personnel, 
this contract is not surpr~sing. Furthermore, the ult~mate 
consumer, the orthopedic pat~ent, can be considered to be 
totally ignorant of these considerations. 
The question, "Would more un~form and deta~led ~nspec­
tion requirements result in a better quality implant?" can 
only be answered on a company-by-company basis. Furthermore 
it would require substantially more information than is avail-
able to the authors. The f~ndings of Cahoon and Paxton (Ref. 
3) c~ted earlier seems to suggest that ~n some instances 
it would. 
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As noted above the llmitations of inspection need to 
be known by all key elements of the productlon endeavor l 
and also the inspection requlrements "bUllt into" each device 
need to be known by the lnspectlon elements of the organiza-
tion. For this reason it appears worth recommendlng that 
orthopedlc manufacturers investigate a coordination method 
slmilar to that required in the aerospace lndustry (MIL-I-
6870) • 
As far as specific inspection techniques are concerned, 
the development and use of realistlc standards to qualify 
each inspection technique is recommended. Other methods, 
such as ultrasonic, eddy current, etc., should be evaluated 
for their potential. Finally, newer inspection devlces llke 
acoustlC emisslon should not be overlooked for thelr poten-
tlal to detect flaws not revealed by the conventional methods. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Design 
The basic design principles to be followed by ~ndustr~es 
including aerospace and biomedical, are established, under-
stood, and generally accepted. Examples of failures to ad-
here to these principles are also common to all industries, 
and aerospace has had ~ts share of improper designs leading 
to early failures caused for example, by ~mproper attention 
to stress concentrations (edge distance from holes, bend 
radi1, sharp corners, engraved mark1ngs, etc.). This bad 
experience in NASA and the aerospace 1ndustry has led to 
a number of corrective measures such as a more deliberate, 
interdisciplinary reV1ew of des1gns before drawing release 
supplemented by special analyses or tests where requ1red. 
Although "paper requirements" won't ~mprove part design 
quality, per se, the establishment of design requirements 
based on service experience, tests, analyses will help in-
sure that bad experiences will not be repeated in the indus-
try or within an organizat1on. For example, the designer 
often expects that higher material strengths yield stronger 
parts; an example of the fallacy of this notion in high 
strength steels is 11lustrated schematically in Figure 13 
where the higher strength conditions are more susceptible 
to notches than the lower strength levels. Provid~ng cau-
tions like this to the des1gner can be a valuable input that 
can only corne from proper communication of good information. 
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Table 8 
Effect of Notch Acuity on Stress 
Concentration Factor 
(All other notch variables constant) 
Notch Radius 
.001 " 
.004" 
.007" 
.025" 
.050" 
KT 
17 
9.4 
7.3 
4.1 
3.1 
Certa1nly, the orthopedic implant industry is not the 
only one plagued w1th des1gn and manufacturing problems 11ke 
tool marks or engraved ident1fication stamps that have in1-
tiated failure. Current statements in specifications that 
these marks should be located in low stress regions are only 
useful 1f a stress analysis exists and the low stress region 
is so identified on the drawing. Many people show the frus-
tration expressed by Hughes and Jordan (Ref. 38 ): 
"The failure of the titanium upper 
femoral replacement was undoubtedly due 
to the loads imposed by a fall. However, 
1t is incredible that the ident1fY1ng 'T' 
should have been spark etched at a posi-
tion of max1mum stress. Titanium im-
plants have been seen to be suscept1ble 
to sharp notches and BS353l: 1962 specif-
ically advises that 1dentifying marks 
should be made at a site of minimal 
stress. " 
-76-
and by Cahoon and Paxton (Ref. 39 ): 
"The violation of elementary design 
principles of implants such as the pres-
ence of sharp corners, insuff~cient metal 
between screw holes and plate edges, and 
screw holes in fixation plates too close 
to the bone fracture have caused fa~lures 
of the implants. These violations must 
be avoided. " 
A s~mple example of the effects of holes on stress con-
centration is shown in F~gure 14 for a hole in an ~nfinite 
plate; a crack grow~ng from a fastener hole is acted on by 
a very high stress level; see Table 8 for the effect of 
notch acu~ty on stress concentration factor. For these rea-
sons, NASA has chosen to establ~sh rigorous controls over 
design pract~ces and design review systems. Whether or not 
these practices and systematic reviews are useful or needed 
~n the orthopedic implant industry is best answered by the 
industry, partic~pating technical societies, and involved 
Government agencies. 
From another v~ew, this limited study did not uncover 
any structural design criteria that are used cons~stently 
within the ~ndustry for metallic implants. Without some 
degree of uniformity, it ~s difficult to see how a level 
of performance of an implant design can be expected if dif-
ferent materials and strength levels are used resulting ~n 
a different percentage of operating stress level to ultimate 
or fatigue limit and therefore likely, large variations in 
fatigue life. By consistent use of a static factor-of-safety 
for example, or a spec~fied endurance strength combined with 
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NOTCH 
TENSILE 
STRENGTH 
. .: 
• 
S~~OOTH TENSILE STlillNGTH 
FIGU'RE 13 
SCHEMATIC OF RELATIONSHIP OF NOTCH/tmNOTCH 
PROPERTIES FOR HIGH STREN~TH STEEL 
(REF. 47.) 
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~,1 1 
b 
T T 
FIGttRE 14 
ILLUSTRATION OF EFFECT OF HOLES 
ON STRESS LEuEL 
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1 
(j 
T 
a load scatter factor for an application, the manufacturer 
can modify design, change materials, etc., and yet the cus-
tomers can expect some consistent performance, all other 
variables constant. 
There appear to be adequate mechanlsms and organizations 
to develop such criteria for specific designs llke bone plates 
or hip prostheses. In addition to ASTM, an industry group, 
OSMA (Orthopedic Surgical Manufacturers Assoclatlon), the 
conferences arranged by NBS, and the Bureau of Medical Devices, 
FDA, offer forums to develop criteria in much the same way 
NASA developed the Space Vehicle Design Criteria serles, 
uSlng Government and industry representatives working together 
to arrive at mutually satisfactory, technically sound crlteria. 
The competitlon withln the orthopedlc industry should not 
be damaged any more than was Boelng's working with Lockheed, 
working with McDonnell-Douglas, Grumman, General Dynamics, 
Bell Aerospace, and Rockwell In developing NASA's criteria. 
There are ways to develop understandings for mutual industry 
benefit without sacrificing company posltion In the industry. 
The data base from whlch to build these criteria is 
largely empirical, but at least it is extensive. Such ground-
work provides a definite inslght into areas where productive 
improvements can be made. 
As cited earlier by one reference, the need to develop 
knowledge from what has worked is likely to be more impor-
tant than to examine what has failed. 
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Therefore, the recommendation for des~gn cons~derat~on 
is to use aerospace design criteria documents as models on 
which to develop mutually agreeable criter~a for a device 
or class of devices in orthoped~c implants. Examinat~on 
of fatigue l~fe, stat~c strength, stra~n-to-failure, or other 
appropriate criteria based on existing, successful applica-
t~ons provides a benchmark for future work. It is recogn~z­
ed that th~s will requ~re cooperation with~n the ~ndustry, 
additional analysis, and much coordination before a usable 
document can be finalized but aerospace experience has shown 
the worth of the effort. 
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Materials 
The lim1ted number of alloy compositions approved for 
use 1n orthopedic implants should indicate that the charac-
ter1st1cs and control of the important mater1al parameters 
1S a reasonable task. Indeed, much 1mpressive work on cor-
rosion behavior, biocompat1bility, and to some extent, effects 
of manufacturing processes on properties has been published. 
As a comparison, MIL-HDBK-5 reports design data on about 
50 alloys (many strength levels) representing hundreds of 
thousands of test p01nts that have been statistically ana-
lyzed for use by the aerospace industry. As was pointed 
out, the use of these data is not a matter of choice for 
the Space Shuttle contractors but is required or propert1es 
of equal statist1cal val1dity are requ1red. 
It would seem to be very beneficial to ass1milate the 
available data on orthopedic alloys into a handbook that 
establ1shes the mechan1cal data from the ASTM specif1cations 
as well as data illustrating the fatigue life (S-N curves, 
Goodman diagrams, etc.), environmental effects (simulated 
body flu1ds), and effects of notches of var10US acuities 
on mechanical strength. As fracture toughness data and 
cyclic flaw growth rate data are developed for these alloys, 
this 1nformation should also be incorporated into the mate-
rials gU1de. Corrosion and data on galvanic series compati-
bility are also of general interest to the industry. 
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Another recommendation is to in1t1ate a well-des1gned 
test program using a single laboratory and common test speci-
men designs, test procedures and data analysis methods to 
evaluate the behavior of these alloys and various strength 
levels without introducing the data scatter that undoubtedly 
exists because of the exper1mental var1ations from laboratory-
to-laboratory. Additionally, env1ronmental effects on mech-
an1cal strength and fatigue properties should be developed 
along with fracture character~stics. 
In addition to aerospace precedents for this type of 
joint act1vity, one can look to the Amer~can Petroleum Insti-
tute, Electric Power Research Institute, and other organiza-
tions who have collect1vely supported test act~vities of 
this type to provide upgrad1ng in the data bases for the 
mutual benef~t of the ~ndustry at large. 
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Analysis 
It is not possible to properly assess the rigor of the 
analytical steps used in the implant industry because very 
little is described in the l~terature and even less was avail-
able from the limited industry contact. It is fa~r to say, 
based on d~scuss~ons, that there ~s an underlying confidence 
in experiment and emp~ricism as the basis of design. It 
is also fair to say that stress analysis and math modeling 
~s the cornerstone of design verification and approval in 
the aerospace industry so that there appears to be a sign~f­
icant d~fference of approach in this technical area. 
The use of fracture mechanics analys~s ~n aerospace 
to establish safe life of cr~tical components is correctly 
l~m~ted to only that cr~ticality of hardware that requires 
it. It ~s to be determined by others ~n the ~plant ~ndus­
try if the cost and time required to develop the needed data 
base and load spectra data warrant the use of these approaches. 
As one industry representative stated, the development of 
a metal implant that doesn't fa~l may drive the fatigue mode 
to the bone ~tself which may be a more catastrophic failure 
location. The conclusion of this study is that there is no 
inherent obstacle to the use of th~s method if the ~ndustry 
or the regulatory bodies feel it is desirable. In any event, 
the use of standardized fracture mechanics data to evaluate 
alloys, advances in strengthening mechanisms, effects of 
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environments, effects of load spectra could represent a sig-
nificant improvement over the "single-point data" often re-
ported in the implant l~terature involv~ng a w~de range of 
test techniques, test environments, and data analyses. 
The recommendation ~s for additional work in develop~ng 
stress analysis models to be ver~fied by experiment and/or 
use data to support l~fe calculations, develop stat~c margins-
of-safety, etc. In addition, the use of fracture mechan~cs 
analyses can prov~de additional lifetime information us~ng 
a large, available technology and should be evaluated. 
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Inspect~on and Approval 
The last point of control in the manufacture of a pros-
thes~s ~s the inspect~on process. Adequate inspection ~s 
~mpl~ed in the design, analysis, and materials phases of 
product~on of each art~cle. The d~mens~ons and surface 
finish, the m~crostructure, the strength and toughness, the 
non-existance of crit~cal cracks all must be assured in order 
for the actual performance of each product to match its ~n­
tended performance. Thus ~t is vital that all elements of 
the production sequence part~cipate in the development and 
operat~on of the inspection cr~teria and procedures. 
Because of the vital role of inspection to product qual-
~ty, the same remarks made above concerning product uniformity 
from manufacturer to manufacturer apply to the inspect~on 
process. No set of ~nspection criteria could be found w~thin 
the implant industry. Although certain manufacturers are 
known to be us~ng ~nspection methods which go beyond the 
two publ~shed ASTM standards, it appears certa~n that manu-
facturers exist which do not approach inspection with the 
r~gor required by MIL-I-6870C. Thus it ~s suggested that 
one of the forums mentioned above (OSMA, FDA, NBS) 
develop an industry-wide inspect~on specificat~on which 
would ~nsure that: 
(1) All key elements in the des~gn, development, manu-
facture, and certification of each device participate in 
the final inspection requirements. 
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(2) Cr1t1cal components and h1gh stress reg10ns requir-
ing special attent10n are identified. 
(3) Capabil1ties and llmitations of inspection are 
adequately fed back into the design and analysis parts of 
the organizat10n. 
(4) The best and most appropr1ate 1nspection techniques 
are being used. 
Such a specification if used un1formly throughout the 
industry would go a long way toward provid1ng un1formity of 
product capabilities from manufacturer to manufacturer. 
The f1nal test of any deV1ce is its performance. From 
this standpoint failure analyses and retrieval analyses serve 
a valuable function to all elements from the patient and 
surgeon back to the orig1nal des1gner. Th1S 1S apparently 
recognized because every manufacturer questioned is perform-
ing fa1lure analyses, ASTM has developed a device retrieval 
standard (F561) as have a number of other organizat1ons (cf. 
NBS Spec1al Publication 601, for example). Such efforts 
tend to pinpoint problems sometimes with embarrass1ng clarity. 
For example, the following quotation was taken from a survey 
done at Stanford Un1versity (Ref. 45 ): 
" A second surgeon operated on 12 
of the 13 j01nts which became loose on 
a delayed basis and one of the two 
which was 1nitially loose. " 
This clearly indicates where one should focus his attention 
to reduce the incidence of loosen1ng. Similarly with new 
designs and processes being introduced and with manufacturers 
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cont1nually changing their products the potential always 
exists for an undetected problem to occMr. The only way 
to spot such problems often is by means of performance ana-
lyses on the final product. Therefore, it is recommended 
that an industry-wide retrieval analysis be considered as 
a means of obtain1ng performance data as rapidly and as in-
expens1vely as possible to be continually fed back 1nto the 
dev1ce development cycle. 
It 1S also recommended that flaws of known character 
be developed and used as standards to appraise the 1nspec-
tion methods being used or considered for use. The optimum 
location in the production sequence for dye penetrant inspec-
tion should be established by exper1ment. Methods of NDT 
not currently in use should be cons1dered for potent1al 
application where x-radiography and dye-penetrant are not 
satisfactory. ACOUSt1C em1ssion combined with proof testing 
is recommended as a possibly useful NDT method for cr1tical 
part inspection. 
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SUMMARY OF 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
o Through ASTM or other approprlate organizations, continue 
to develop test methods and materlal allow abIes on 
orthopedlc implant alloys under slmulated use conditions. 
Both static and cyclic data will be needed to support 
designs and analyses. 
o By examining the existing implant use data base, develop 
general design factors and good practices to serve as 
alds for lmproving devices through meaningful engineering 
comparisons of hardware. 
o Continue to evaluate the use of analytical approaches 
such as finite element analysis and fracture mechanics 
analysis to develop analytical models for future improve-
ments. 
o Contlnue to evaluate new inspection and flaw detection 
methods to lmprove raw material and part quality as an 
lnput to fracture mechanics analyses and as a means of 
improvlng reliability and performance. 
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APPENDIX A 
Ref: "Case Studies l.n Fracture Mechanics", Edited by T. P. Rich 
and D. J. Cartwrl.ght, Army Materl.a1s and Mechanl.cs Research 
Center, Watertown, MA 02172, June 1977. 
DAMAGE TOLERANCE DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF A TYPICAL 
AIRCRAFT WING STRUCTURE (NEW OR EXISTING) 
Pir M. Toor 
Blonton M. Payne 
lockheed-Georgia Company 
Marietta, Georgia 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Damage tolerance design has become a necessity in the design of modern aircraft although 
its importance was recognized as long as four centuries ago. Around the end of the fif-
teenth century the first technical notes were written on what must have been the fi~t re-
quirements for damage tolerant design. These were in notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci In 
which he discussed the physics of fl ight and the design of flying machines. He wrote: 
"In constructing wings one should make one cord to bear the strain and a 
looser one in the same position so that if the one breaks under stroin the 
other is in position to serve the same function. " 
About two decades ago (1954), after the disastrous failure [1] of Comet aircraft in the air 
near Italy, structural design engineers and research workers saw the need of applying dam-
age tolerance concepts to the design of aircraft structu(e The United States Civil Aero-
nautics Boord has defined the damage tolerant structure as one in which: 
"Catastrophic failure or excessive structural deformation, which could 
adversely affect the fl ight characteristics of the airplane, are not prob-
able after damage or obvious partial damage of a single principal struc-
tural element." 
In 1969, after the F-lll failures [2J, the United States Air Force initiated the Air Force 
Structural Integrity Program with the coordination of the Aerospace Industry Association 
(AlA). Dama~e tolerance structure (structural safety and durability) is described in MIL-
STD-1530A [3J and associated Military Specifications [4, 5]. The basic criterion is: 
"The assurance that safety of flight structure of each aircraft will achieve and 
maintain a specified residual strength level throughaut the anticipated service 
life. Further assurance that the fleet can operate effectively with a minimum 
of structural maintenance, inspection and downtime, etc. II 
However, the essence of damage tolerance design is to ensure thaJ the structure will con-
tinue to sustain a high proportion of its design load even after damage has occurred. The 
basic philosophy of damage tolerant design is based on: 
A-l 
The acceptance that damage will occur for one reason or another despite 
all precautions token 
2 An adequate system of inspection prescribed so that the damage (cracks) 
may be detected and repairs made at a proper time. 
3 An adequate residual strength maintained in the damaged ~tructure so that, 
during the period between inspections when the damage is undetected, ulti-
mate failure of the structure is not possible. 
In the earl y fifties, due to a lack of comprehensive damage tolerance methodology, large-
scale component test results were used to develop empirical damage toleronce methods. 
Although in 1913 Inglis [6J attempted the elastic stress analysis of cracks in an infinite 
plate under various degrees of biaxial tension, it is only recently [7J that linear elastic 
fracture mechanics (LEFM) has been used to predict residual strength and crock growth 
rates in damaged structure. 
The objective af this study case is a systematic investigation of the damage tolerance de-
sign capability (residual strength and crack growth) of a typical aircraft wi ng structure 
(new or existing) using linear elastic frocture mechanics. The assumptions made and the 
limitations applied are discussed in detail at each step of the development and analysis of 
the case study. A specific example in this case study is to establish inspection intervals 
for a typical aircraft wing structure lower surface rear span cap. 
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
A first approach toward minimizing the risk of catastrophic or rapid fracture in structures 
is to use materials with as high a fracture taughness as possible. This should be consistent 
with strength, environment, etc., involved in the specific appl ication. In aircraft struc-
tures, weight-to-strength ratio is the most pertinent foetor. Usually, weight consider-
ations dictate relatively high stress levels so that the fracture toughness available is lim-
ited even on a very carefully selected material. Hence a trade-off is required and gener-
ally materials are used at lower than maximum strength. This results in a weight sacrifice. 
Another way to ensure damage tolerant design is to employ ingenious design innovations 
rather than material specifications. In general, in a damage tolerant design concept the 
following points must be considered ski l!full y: 
a Material selection or control (material should be as flaw tolerant as 
possible) . 
b Design concepts (mul tiple load paths). 
c Stress level selection and control (fatigue crocks should not propagate 
rapidly during the service life). 
A-2 
d Impection procedures - crocks must be detected prior to any imp::Jirment of 
the load carrying capacity of the structure. 
e Process control - control during manufacturing and processing to ensure that 
the initial flows are small and the basic fracture projrerties are not impaired 
by manufacturing processing. 
f Environment effect - resistance to stress corrosion crocking must be evalu-
ated and controlled. 
9 Fracture toughness control - variation of fracture to,ughness and other asso-
ciated parameters within the heat-treatment range must be thoroughly char-
acterized. 
h Static and fatigue design allowables must be evaluated carefully. 
STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR 
The basic development of linear elastic fracture mechanics is well documented [8 - 14J. 
However, in order to systematically use fracture mechanics in the design and analysis of 
a structure, the stress intensity factor K and the influence of various parameters on it must 
be completely understood as the crocking rate is dependent upon it. The stress intensity 
factor K in the ideal case of an infinite plate containing a central straight crock of length 
20 and subjected to plane stress 0 acting uniformly and perpendicularly to the crack is ex-
pressed as: 
K = 0';;-; (1) 
where 
K is the stress intensity factor (KSI /IN) 
0 is the remote stress (KS I) 
a is the half crack length (in) 
THICKNESS EFFECT 
The critical stress intensity factor is very much dependent an material thickness B. In real 
structure there is a large variation in thickness at various sections, therefore variation of 
Kc with thickness must be evaluated. Figure I displays the variatiafl af Kc versus B for 
7075-T6511. There are three distinct regions which exhibit three characteristic type of 
failure modes, namely, plane stress, mixed mode and plane strain. =-This curve is devel-
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oped using a limited number of test specimens. The right hand side af the curve can be 
accurately established using the ASTM standard E-399 specimen, but currently there is no 
standard specimen far the mixed mode and plane stress regions. 
PLASTICITY EFFECT 
As discussed previously, linear elastic fracture mechanics is based on linear elasticity. 
Virtually all materials exhibit some ability to deform plastically without fracture. If the 
size of the plastic zone around the crock tip is very much smaller than all other signifi-
cant dimensions of the structure and the crock length, the value of K elastically calcu-
lated is not very much changed. However, when the plastic zone becomes larger, as in 
a relatively ductile material, the value of K becomes questionable, and the effects of 
plasticity can be formul ated as follows: 
r p = 2
1
" (~y )2 for pi one stress (20) 
'p = 4)," (~yy for plane strain (2b) 
where rp is the plastic zone radius at the tip of the crack, K is the. fracture toughness 
stress intensity factor, CT y is the material yield stress. 
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CRACK GROWTH EQUATION 
The use of the concept of Fracture mechanics in the design and analysis of structure as-
sumes the existence of initial flows or crocks. These crocks under repe.oted service load-
ing conditions propagate and become unstable (Fast fracture) when critlcal length is at-
tained The rate of crock propagation depends an many Factors, such qs material, envi-
lanment, service laod spectrum, crock geometry and local structural configurat ion. It is 
~hawn U6) that for a particular material the crock growth rate (da/dN) can be described 
os a Function of stress intensity range 6. K as shown in Fig 2. At present, there are large 
~umbers of crock growth equations The Forman crock growth equation [17J, given below 
will be used in the present case study 
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(3) 
where, da/dN is the rote of crock growth, c and n are material constants, ~K is the stress 
intensity range, R is the stress rotio defined as minimum stress divided by maximum stress 
and Kf is a critical stress intensity faclor. The stress rntenslty range ~K =~o;;;a . f3 T 
where ~o is the stress range, a is the crack length and {3T is the product of various bound-
ary condition correction facton. 
Th~ value of c and n (material constants) in Eq. 3 can be calculated from constant ampli-
tude test data by applying the following rectification technique to the Forman equation 
log /(1 - R) Kf -~K 1+log(;~) = log c + n log 6K. ( 4) 
For any two coordinate points, say6K., {da/dN}. and6K(. + 1)' da/dN . , which 
I I I (I. + 1) 
represent a segment of the crock growth rate curve, one can solve two simu foneous equa-
tions for c and n. 
LOAD INTERACTION 
The crack growth analysis under constant amplitude cycling is fairly straightforward On 
in-service struclure the load conditions are quite complex. High and low loads are mixed 
Thererore, to calculate the crock growth the load interaction must be token into account. 
There are quite a few load interaction or retardation models to account for the load se-
quence effects. In this case study, only the Willenborg model [18] will be discussed and 
used. A peak load in the spectrum creates a plastic zone ahead of the crack tip. This 
plastic zone can cause retardation in the crack growth because there are compressive 
stresses in the plastic zone caused by tension stresses in the surrounding elastic material. 
In other words, the crock is operating at on effectively smaller alternating stress until the 
crack grows through the peak stress plastic zone. 
The Willenborg retardation model accounts for the retardation effects by modifying the 
stress intensity ronge ~K and the stress ratio R in the constant ampl itude da/dN data to on 
effective stress intensity range 6Ke ff and an effective stress ratio Reff. The effective 
stress intensity ronge and stress ratio are calculated as a function of the size and location 
of the current yield zone and the yield zone produced by the peak load. After the appli-
cation of a peak overload the plastic zone can be calculated using Eq. 20 or 2b. If a 
peak stress 01 is encountered in the spectrum followed by another stress cycle 02 such 
that 02 «01, the peak stress ° 1 will produce a plastic zone ahead of the crock tip. 
Following the overload, the crack will continue to grow under a cyclic loading 602 = 
02Max - 02Min' The growth rate, however, is delayed as long as_ no subsequent maxi-
mum stress greater than 01 is applied and as long as the growth remains within the zone of 
plasticity caused by the overload 01. Assume that a third stress lev~1 03 = 00 (less than 
01) occurs following the lost cycle of 02 and that growth has not completely progressed 
A-6-
through the yield zone caused by the first overload. The retardation will be terminated 
when the value of applied stress is large enough compared to the first overload (00 < 01) 
ond the current crock length is of such on extent that the following condition existf. 
o + r 
c yap (5) 
where r is the yield zone caused by 0 at current crock length, 0c. Using Eq. 2 for 
plane sYr~Ps, the applied stress required tg~each a pl can be calculated as: 
r = _I (~,2 = _1 (~2 
°c yap 271 0y 2 0y 
or ~ 0 = o yap ap y a c 
now inserting the value of r from Eq 5 in the above equation, we get: yap 
FIG. 3 
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(6) 
Oap may be thought of as the effective portion of 01 remaining following the application 
of 01 . As retardation is a function of the differences in applied stresses, the amount that 
02 is reduced is the difference oap - 02 (Max) at any cra.ck length, i.e., 
o 
red = 0 - O 2 (Max) ap 
The effective reduced stress is dependent on Oz and variable with current crack length. 
Thus, fol lowing the overload, O2 (Max), 02 (Min) are reduced by the amount ored. 
These values are used to compute the reduced crack growth rate. 
The limitations of this model are: 
It does not toke into account the negative stresses (compression stresses). 
2 It cannot handle the negative overload effects. 
3 It does not differentiate between single or multiple overloads. 
DESIGN 
(7) 
For on efficient damage tolerant design structure, the designer must select a material as a 
compromi se with strength and weight. Ideally, a material with high yield strength and 
high fracture toughness is desired. However, in reality this is not possible, as it is gener-
ally known [19J that fracture toughness Kc decreases with increasing yield strength for 
aluminum and many other materials. This variation is in part due to the inherent charac-
teristics of impurities associated with the manufacturing processes of the material. 
Another important parameter in the design of a structure is the establishment of on accept-
able operating stress level so that critical length crocks do not occur for a specified num-
ber of flight hours. Generally, for 7000 series aluminum aircraft wing structure, the de-
signer chooses 50 to 65 percent of the yield strength of the material as a design limit 
stress. 
Using linear elastic fracture mechanics, and the available nondestructive inspection (NOt) 
capability for detecting flows the designer can screen for the suitability of a particular 
material. Using the criterion that the structure will be inspected and crock lengths must 
be stable up to limit load stress and neglecting plasticity effects, the following relation-
ship can be established between applied stress and critical crock length. 
K 
for very wide plate o = 
A-8 
Comparing the critical crack length a to the crack detection capgbilities of the NDI 
techniques available for a particular Jesign, the material can be accepted or rejected, 
( 8) 
i e., if the crack becomes critical before it can be detected, another material wi II need 
to be selected, stress levels lowered, or design for the "non-impectable category" as de-
fined in MIL 83444 [4]. 
ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
The analysis of crack propagation requires a working knowledge of the stress intemity fac-
tor ond the various other parameters in influencing it. Therefore, it is appropriate at this 
stage to discuss the IIboundary condition ll correction factors needed in the case study to 
modify the stress intensity factar. The majority of cracks in a typical wing structure ema-
nate from fastener holes as corner cracks, where the influence of the hole and the fastener 
load transfer become important. There are no exact classical solutions for load transfer 
effect on the crack growt h, however through recent appl ication of detailed finite element 
models excellent two-dimensional approximations of load transfer correction factors have 
been derived. Assumi ng no load transfer, the modified stress intensity foctor for a quar-
ter circular corner crack emanating from the fastener hole can be written as follows: 
(9) 
,..--------~/f 
B } 
BACK SURFACE 
FIG.4 CIRCULAR CORNER CRACK AT THE.. 
FASTENER HOLE 
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where f3 f is the front surface (the free surface coincident with the initiation location of 
the crack) correction factor. This factor is [20J 1. 12. {3b is a foetor accounting the in-
fl uence of the back surface [21J of the panel on a pqrt-through corner crack. f3h accounts 
for the influence of hole and is a function of 0/ r where a is the cra~k length and r is the 
radius of the hole. {3h may be modified to account for the influencl(of a fastener filled 
hole and load transfer. For a corner crock emanating from the faste,!er hole, crock growth 
predictions are more correct if f3h is considered a function of a/12r, -;where l/j2comes 
from the location of a point at 45° on the quarter circular corner crock [22]. 
f3 and f3w ore the plasticity and width correction foctors given by [23J and [24], respec-
.P I tlve y. 
where c is the visible crock length and () is the angle locating a specific point on the 
crock front with respect to the axis of symmetry. For a quarter circle crock, M = 1. 
71/2 [ (2 2 ) ] ~ ~ = I 1 - c c; a Sin20 dO = 71/2 foro =c 
Assuming a wide panel where finite width correction is not necessary and considering the 
plasticity effect minimum so that this correction can also be ignored, by using the quoted 
values of f3f and M/cp, Eq. 9 for a quarter circular crack becomes: 
= (10) 
Further geometric correction factors needed for a specific problem are given in the next 
section. 
CRACK GROWTH ANALYSIS 
The damage tolerant design of on aircraft wing structure requires a reliable method of pre-
dicting the crock growth from some defined initial crack length to the size where unstable 
crock growth is imminent. In order to perform the crack growth analysis using linear elas-
tic fracture mechanics, the fallowing information is required. 
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Structural geometry 
2 Crock geometry 
3 Spectrum stresses 
4 Material crack growth and crock stability data 
5 Initial crock size 
The accuracy of the crock growth predictions depends upon accurate da/dN versus 6K 
data and the modified stress intensity factors discussed previously. da/dN versus ~K for 
a typical material is shown in Figure 2. It can be observed that the log-log curve has 
three characteristic regions; lower, middle, and upper. The lower region corresponds to 
the limiting stress intensity foetor value Kth, known as the threshold stress intensity factor, 
below which value crock growt h does not seem to propagate for that particular material. 
The middle region of the curve corresponds to the stable crack growth region, where the 
rate of the crack growth seems to be linear. The upper region is near to the unstable 
crack growth point and the Iimi ting value is the critical intensity foetor Kc. 
The stress ratio R and the environment have a significant effect on this curve. In addition 
the scatter in the basic crac k growth data must be taken into account by repeating a real-
istic number of tests. The initial test crack length should be within the nondestructive in-
spection (NDJ) capability [25J 
For analysis the number of cycles or fI ight hours required for growth of the initial flaw to 
critical dimensions are calculated by a process of integration using Eq. 3. The stress in-
tensity range 6K corresponding to the initial crack length ai and crock geometry is calcu-
lated using Eq. 9, assuming that the crack storts from the fastener hole. This value of 
stress intensity range ~K is used with constant amplitude laboratory test data to determine 
the crack growth rate, da/dN. The crack extension increment 6ai during a period, 6N, 
can be calculated by integrating Eq. 3. This value of crack extension 6ai is added to the 
initial crack length ai to determine the new stress intensity range and a new crock growth 
rate. Eq. 3 is again used for another period to give further crack extension and iteration 
process is repeated until the critical crock length is achieved. 
In order to take into account the retardation effect discussed previously, the stress inten-
sity range and R value must be modified using Eq. 7, and the same iteration process ap-
plied. 
DAMAGE TOLERANCE DESIGN CRITERIA 
Fracture mechanics analysis is carried out on two types of structures: (1) new design and 
(2) existing structure. These currently have different criteria. On existing structure, 
analysis is carried out to determine inspection requirements, or safe operating life, while 
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analysis of new design is carried out to meet a specific set of criteria 
General requirements and detail criteria are defined in Refs [3 - 5Jfor both types of 
structures The example problem described in this case study consists of existing structure 
operating under a defined spectrum. The pertinent features of the criteria applicable to 
existing structure are: 
a What locations should be analyzed? The locations are chosen by reviewing test 
_article failures, particularly the fatigue test articles If no test article informa-
tion is available, the analysis points must be selected by using static and/or fa-
tigue analysis, by study of service or fatigue failures on similar structures, or by 
examination of drawings. 
b What size flows should be assumed in the anal ysis? The size and configuration of 
the initial flow is a very pertinent parameter in the fracture analysis. Some ratio-
nale, analytical or arbitrary must be used to select on initial flow size and shope. 
A great deal of guidance, particularly for military aircraft, can be found in [4J 
where the size and configuration of the initial flaws are specified as a function of 
the category/slow crock growth, fail-safe multielement, or foil-safe crack Q.i.(est). 
For example, in the "slow crack growth category, II the specified initial flaw in a 
hole is on .05 inch crock. For thickness greater than .05 inch, the assumed 
flow is a .05 inch radius corner flow, and for thickness less than or equal to .05 
inch, the flaw is a .05 inch through-the-thickness flow. Various other flaw sizes 
are similarly defined. The criteria allows reduction of the assumed initial flaw by 
taking into occount special fostener and inspection procedures. The criteria also 
differentiate between the assumed initial flaw and the detectable flow. An as-
sumed initial flaw, ai' or equivalent initial flow, is the result of manufacturing 
and fabrication processes and a regression analysis of test results. The detectable 
flow, adet, is a flaw that a particular inspection technique can be expected to 
detect. The time to the first inspection is calculated using the assumed initial 
flow established by specification or by agreement while the second and the subse-
quent inspection intervals are determined using the detectable flow, 0det, corre-
sponding to the applicable NDI inspection technique. 
In the example problem shown later the assumed initial flow is an .001 in radius 
corner flow in a hole. In this instance, the small flow is chosen just to generate 
the crack growth curve over the small flow range and does not represent a realistic 
initial flow for establ ishment of the inspection interval. 
c What maximum load level will crock instability be checked against? The maximum 
expected load level mayor may not be in the crock growth spectrum. If crack ar-
rest due to peak loads (retardation) is considered, it can be unconservative to in-
clude maximum expected peak loads or limit load, since the peak loads may nat 
actually occur on a specific airplane. MIL-A-83444 [4] defines the load levels 
for which crack instability must be analyzed. The maximum expected load level 
is defined as a function of "degree of inspectability and inspection interval," i.e., 
the shorter the inspection the less likely a limit load will be encountered during 
the interval. 
In the example problem, limit load i, u,ed to determine the Tirst (initial), the 
second and su~equent inspection intervals. 
d Crack metamorphosis? Since there is a large number of possible crock growth 
paths, the most critical (fastest growing) should be anal yzed . Test data and/or 
finite element models and analysis must be used to determine the most critical 
crack path. As expected, cracks start at peak stress points and propagate in a 
direction perpendicular to the maximum principal stress. Mll-A-83444 lends sig-
nificant guidance on determining crack path through specific requirements on con-
tinuing damage. 
e What safety factors, and/or test will be used to verify accurocy analysis? Obvi-
ously, safety factors and verification level are related.~-high level of confi-
dence can be established in the analysis technique, a lower safety factor can be 
used than if a low or questionable level of verification exist. 
Safety factors should also be related to inspection technique; for example, if a 
complex NOI inspection technique is required to detect relatively small flaws, a 
higher safety factor should be used than if a simple NDI technique is used to de-
tect large flaws. Crack growth rate is more accurately predicted if load sequenc-
ing effect (retardation) is accounted for in the analysis; however, some form of 
spectrum test should be performed to verify the ability of the retardation model to 
predict the crack behavior. In the example problem a safety factor of 2 is used 
on the inspection intervals. 
EXAMPLE APPLICATION 
The example given below displays the use of fracture mechanics in analyzing an existing 
structural element. The crack growth analysis procedure is equally applicable to new or 
existing structure The only difference is the damage tolerent design criteria which is 
briefly discussed in the last section. 
EXAMPLE: Using fracture mechanics procedures described in the previous sections, per-
form residual strength and creck growth analysis for the given existing structurel element 
of a front beam cap on the lower surface of a typical aircraft wing. The analysis will con-
sist of deriving stability curves (critical stress ocr versus critical crack length acr) and 
growth curves (crack length versus flight hours). Using the stability curves, establish crit-
ical crack lengths for I im it load stress (33 KS I) and establ ish the flight hours associated 
with crack lengths at this stress. 
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Structural element. A ...... hown in Figure 5, the grain direction<.. are perpendicular to 
crack and parallel to load direction 
Material: 7075-T6511 extrusion 
Yield stre ... s = 70 KSI 
Fracture toughness Kc for .2 inch thickness frol'll' Figure 1 is equal 
to 64 KSI Fn ~ 
Plain strain fracture toughness K1c from Figure ~1 = 23 0 KSI..ji;; 
da/dN versus ~K is given in Figure 2, consta~t amp I itude data for 
R=O 
Spectrum Stresses: Shown in Table I, adjusted to represent stresses perpendicular to 
crack growth and the sequence of missions is shown in Table III. 
Assume four phases of crock growth analysis, start with Phase I part-through quarter circu-
lar corner crack from the wall of the hole and terminating at the back surface of the ele-
ment. For Phase II, the initial crack is a 0.2 inch single edge through crack from the 
edge of the hole and terminating at the edge of the element. Initial crock length for 
Phase III is a 0.005 port-through quarter circular corner crock from the second wall of the 
hole and terminating at the back surface of the element. The beginning crock length for 
Phose IV is 1.356 inch edge crock which is composed of edge distance, hole diameter and 
the element thickness. 
SOLUTIONS 
Crack configurations and stress intensity factors for each phose are given below, using Eq. 
a with appropriate geometric correction factors: 
Phase I Quarter circular, port-through comer crock from the edge of a hole of initial 
crack length ai = .001 inch. 
K = .712 o~. f3 sg 
Phose II Through single crock from the edge of a hole - initial crock length for this 
phase is .2 inch equal to the thickness of the port, ai = .2 inch. 
K = u - r;;;-. f3h· f3 f3 
"V "u sg· w 
Phose III Quarter circular, part-through corner crock from the opposite edge of the hole 
wall of initial length ai = .005 inch. 
K = .712 uFo . f3s g 
Phose IV An equivalent edge crock of initial crock length of ai = 1.356 inch. 
K = u-[iro:. f3s . 
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TABLE CRACK GROWTH SPECTRUM 
MAX MIN CYClfS MAX MIN CYCLES MAX NIN CYCLES 
STRESS StRESS fllGHI StRESS StRESS fllGHI SI~ESS SIRE 55 fllGHI 
KSI KSI KSI KSI KSI KSI 
MIS 0 20327 -3 9~9 100 MIS 7 16 302 -1 630 100 MIS 11 8 758 000 100 
MIS 1 9 97~ 
-
997 100 9 2B2 7 282 335 00 5 373 3 373 1032 00 
.,81e 2 816 219 00 10 29. 6 29~ 7200 6 626 2 626 155 00 
6 002 2 002 29 00 11 2B2 5 282 1600 7 769 1 769 26 00 
7 057 1 057 00 12 236 • 236 .00 8 758 758 500 
e 22. 
-
129 00 13 827 2 ~52 100 10 B89 -1 257 100 
9 97. -2 2U 10 16 302 - 3.2 10 13 818 -3 99. 10 
1/152 11 586 -1 159 100 MIS S lB 717 -1 872 100 MISI2 7 697 -1 367 100 
6 0.9 • 0.9 293 00 10 .2. 8 ~2. HB 00 7 697 000 100 
7 359 3 359 .0 00 11 731 7 731 107 00 7 697 000 100 
B 3~5 2 3~5 600 12 7.2 6 7.2 25 00 7 697 000 100 
9 726 BB5 100 13 751 5 751 600 13 605 -1 367 100 
11 586 -1 3U 10 U 699 • 699 100 8 690 000 100 15 9.2 3 392 100 B 690 000 100 
MI53 10670 -1 067 100 18 717 271 10 8690 000 I 00 
7 030 5030 .20 00 MIS 9 18 ~1 -1 8~ 100 8 690 000 100 B 030 • 030 6000 10 .79 8 .79 5332 3 332 1008 00 B 988 2 98B 1000 383 00 11 706 7706 6 565 2 565 153 00 10670 1 257 100 91 00 7 697 1 697 26 00 12 670 6 670 22 00 
MIS 4 13 28B -1 329 100 13 6.3 .5 6.3 600 8690 690 100 
:: 573 ~ ..... .., ~73 00 I~ !o7B ~ 57B 100 10 791 -I 305 100 
9 860 5860 85 00 15 759 3309 100 13 665 -4 030 10 
10 906 4 906 16 00 lB ~1 273 10 
11 916 3 916 300 MI5 1016 556 -1 656 100 13 2B8 2 265 100 11 170 9 170 321 00 
MI55 13 735 -1 373 100 12 171 8 171 8600 
7 "9 5 .~9 31. 00 13 155 7 155 2. 00 
B 592 4 592 55 00 14 130 6 130 700 
9 621 3 621 1000 15 067 5 067 200 
10 551 2 551 200 16 556 3 475 100 
11 576 I .11 100 MIS 11 13 735 -I 205 10 7 769 -1 383 100 
7 769 000 100 
MIS 6 15 767 -1 .577 100 7 769 000 100 
10206 8206 567 00 7 769 000 100 
11 561 7 561 11600 13 B2B 000 100 
12 607 6607 2.5 00 8758 000 100 
13 629 5629 600 8758 000 100 
I. 591 4 591 100 8 758 000 100 
1.5 767 3 329 100 8758 000 100 
TABLE II GEOMETRIC CORRECTION FACTOR FOR VARIOUS PHASES 
PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III PHASE IV 
I3i : f3t fJ b f30 fJ" fJI z fJ, A.. f3.c fJI zfJ, fJt, Ac Ii. fJI: A, fJF 
0 2L 0 ~ 0 fJT 0 fiT 
001 4 01 200 180 005 1023 1 356 1 63 
003 385 250 1 7.5 007 10 a. 1 40 163 
005 3 70 300 1 70 009 986 150 1~ 
007 3 56 350 1 69 020 883 1 60 1 .5 
009 3 42 400 1 70 040 7 53 1 70 1 39 
020 286 450 1 76 (y"0 6 51 180 1 36 
040 2 33 500 1.84 080 5 79 190 1 35 
060 206 550 I 93 100 524 200 1 47 
080 188 600 206 120 4 BB 2 10 1 65 
100 1 7.5 650 2 27 140 4 70 2 20 1 63 
120 1 67 700 2~ 160 4 ~ 2 30 1 63 
UO 1 61 750 284 180 453 2 40 1 62 
160 158 800 322 200 4 89 250 1 5B 
180 1 62 B50 3 82 2 60 1 57 
200 1 78 900 4 80 2 70 156 
950 7 10 280 1~ 
1 000 290 153 
300 153 
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TABLE III SEQUENCE OF MISSIONS IN 500 HRS PASS 
I 7 
'1 8 
3 I 
~ '1 
5 1'1 
6 7 
7 5 
8 \I 
9 8 
10 9 
\I 7 
12 I 
13 12 
I~ '1 
15 7 
16 8 
17 \I 
18 5 
19 I 
'10 7 
21 1'1 
'12 ~ 
'13 2 
'1~ 7 
25 8 
26 6 
27 \I 
28 I 
29 12 
30 7 
31 8 
.n 2 
33 5 
J~ 7 
35 I 
36 9 
37 12 
38 8 
39 II 
~O 7 
~I 2 
~2 5 
~3 1'1 
~~ 7 
~5 2 
~6 8 
~7 I 
~B 9 
--------
~9 4 
50 7 
51 12 
52 8 
53 II 
~ 5 
55 7 
~ I 
57 2 
5B 12 
59 8 
60 7 
61 0 
6'1 3 
63 5 
64 I 
65 7 
66 12 
67 8 
6B 2 
69 \I 
70 9 
71 7 
72 I 
.17 
73 12 97 
74 8 98 
75 7 99 
76 5 100 
77 2 101 
7B 4 101 
79 I 103 
BO 8 104 
BI 7 105 
82 12 106 
83 \I 107 
8~ 9 lOB 
85 7 109 
86 8 110 
87 2 III 
88 5 112 
39 I 113 
90 1'1 1\4 
91 7 115 
n 10 116 
93 8 117 
9~ II \I B 
;>5 3 119 
96 7 120 
'1 
I 
1'1 
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'1 
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FIG. 5 STRUCTURAL DEl AILS AT THE LOCATION OF ANALYSIS 
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f3b and f3h are as discussed before, f3s is the geometric correction factors for the slot ef-
fect {edge crack plus the hole} and is calculated using a cracked finite element model [26]. 
Note that a/-{2 should be used for {3h and f3s for port-through Phases I and III for an 
equivalent crock length at 45° or at the mid point of the quarter circle. f3s is the stless 
gradient correction foetor due to the adjacent structural changes and-it is caqculoted using 
the finite element model. f3 w is the secant width correction factor. ~ The various Beta 
factors {geometric boundary correction factors} are given in Table II. ~ 
The above stress intensity factors are modified to take into account the load interaction 
effect (variable ompl itude spectrum) by using Eq. 7. The Forman equation ond the 
Willenborg retardation model described in the previous section ore used to evaluate the 
crack growth. A comput er program [27] is used on a 500 hour repeating block spectrum 
to analytically generate a crack growth curve. The computer program "crock growth" uses 
a numerical integration technique [28-29J to generate a da/dF versus a curve where dF is 
an increment of the 500 hour block. Using Eq. 10 and making appropriate geometric cor-
rection factors for each phase, the critical stress for critical crack length can be calcu-
lated. The results are plotted in Figure 6. For limit load stress (33 KSJ), the critical 
crack length is 1.3. The crack length versus flight hours i~ plotted in Figure 7. The crit-
ical crack length for limit stress is shown on the graph. 
The primary objective of this analysis is to ensure the safety of the structure Hence, the 
inspection of the structure in an economical way plays an important role. Economy of the 
inspection procedure depends on the procedure used and upon the cri ticality of the struc-
ture The inspection intervals are established using 0 detectoble crack length (based on 
the particular inspection procedure used) and the critical crack length. Assume for the 
present case study the initial flaw, ai, is .05 and adet is . 15 inch and the critical crock 
length, ac , at limit load is 1.3 inches. 
Based on the above assumptions, the required inspections, including a sarety factor of 2, 
and protecting the aircraft for limit load, the intervals are as follows: 
Initial inspection 
2nd and subsequent 
inspections 
= 
= 
= 
Time @ a c = 1.30 
23450 - 19000 
2 
Time @ a c = 1.30 
23450 - 21500 
2 
2 
= 
2 
= 
Time @ ai = .05 
4450 = 2225 Hrs 
-2-
Time @ adet = .15 
975 Hrs. 
Nate: Inspection interval calculated as an example only, not to represent any speCific aircraft. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Basic fracture mechanics concepts and a sample anal ysis is described to establish in-
spection intervals that will ensure the safety of an existing aircraft structure. Longer 
inspection intervals can be realized by lowering the operating stress levels (aircraft 
restrictions) or if the short inspection intervals are confined to C? few "hot spots" a 
"local beefup" may effectively be used to locally lower tl,e stress. Any reduction in 
operating stress level has a very significant effect on crack growth since the minimum 
value of n for on aluminum alloy in the Forman equation is approximately 3, which is 
to say that the "time to grow" will increase as the cube of the stress reduction. 
2 Parameters such as load transfer, spectrum derivation, load sequence effects (retarda-
tion) and special boundary conditions which effect crack growth characteristics are 
discussed only briefly in the text. There are a number of sophisticated techniques 
currently being developed ond used to handle these parameters and are available in 
the "literature" but ore considered outside the scope of this case study. 
3 Fundamental fracture mechanics methodology thot more accurately predicts the be-
havior of crock growth is developing at a very rapid rate. Therefore, the analyst 
should be aware of the current "state of the art" on such things as retardation models, 
effects of cyclic rate, threshold K's and other parameters effecting crock growth 
behavior. 
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(1) Full scale spectrum testing - 3 to 4. 
For the usual case, a scatter factor of four should be used 
for full scale spectrum testing. The factor may be reduced to 
three if equivalent safety is provided by determining crack 
location and growth rate and prescribing an inspection program 
based on this information that will assure that catastrophic 
failure will not result from initiation and growth of fatigue 
cracks. The specified inspection program should include 
specific information on When, where, and how to inspect the 
critical portions of the structure. The inspection openings 
and techniques should be adequate and appropriate to the 
inspection capability for the cate~ory of airplane involved. 
(2) Component testing -5 to 7. 
The factor will depend on the experience level of the appli-
cant adjudged on the degree to which he develops a test 
loading and a specimen which accurately simulates operational 
loadin~ and stress distributions and the full scale structure. 
This should include consideration of spectrum loading, realism 
of the spectrum, and the degree to which the test structure 
support and loading simulates that of the full-scale structure. 
The upper value would apply to the usual S-N test, while the 
lower value would apply to an exceptional realistic spectrum 
test of components. 
(3) Analysis alone -7 to 8. 
For the usual case a scatter factor of eight should be used 
for analysis alone. Where the designer presents data which 
shows that his knowledge of the stresses and fatigue properties 
of his structure is comprehensive based on flight measurements 
and on previous test and use of the type of construction in 
similar designs, a scatter factor as low as seven may be used. 
b. If additional specimens are tested, the above test factors may be 
reduced by dividing by the following factor: 
antilog (3.511 X 0.14 (l+l/Ns)~ - 3.511 u (l+l/Nt)~) 
where -
Ns c number of specimens specified 
Nt = number of specimens tested 
u = standard deviation of log of test life = 0.14 unless sufficient 
specimens tested to conclusively establish standard deviation. 
B-1 
c. Should an airplane that has previously been evaluate~ with 
a safe l1fe be subjected to a mission change, gross weight 
increase, or gross weight increase with structural material 
added (without changing existing stress concentrations), 
to decrease the operating stress level, the scatter factor 
used in original evaluation would be applicable to adjust the 
previously established safe life. 
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APPENDIX C 
MILITARY SPECIFICATION 
MIL-I-6870c 
27 March 1973 
SUPERSEDING 
MIL-I-6870B(ASG) 
25 February 1965 
INSPECTION PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTING: 
FOR AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE MATERIALS AND PARTS 
This specif1cation is approved for use by all 
Departments and\Agencies of the Department of Defense. 
I 
1. SCOPE 
1.1 Scope. This specification covers requirements for establishing 
the nondestructive tes'ting (NDT) program for the procurement of all 
supplies or services when referenced in the item specificat1on, contract, 
or order. 
1.2 Applicability. ]his specification shall apply to all materials 
and parts for aircraft and missiles and their propulsion systems when 
nondestructive testin~ is required for acceptance. 
__________ ________ -L 
Kr.r r.Kr.1'1 \..r. UU\"Ul"1r.1'1.1,.O 
2.1 Government documents. The issues of the following documents in 
effect on the date of (invitation for bids or request for proposals 
form a part of this s~cification to the extent specified herein: 
SPECIFICATIONS 
Military 
MIL-I-6866 
MIL-I-6868 
MIL-I-8950 
MIL-I-83387 
STANDARDS 
Federal 
Inspection, Penetrant Method of 
Inspection Process, Magnetic Particle 
Inspection Ultrasonic, Wrought Hetals, 
Process for 
Inspection Process, Magnetic Rubber 
Federal Test Method 
Std. No. 151 Metals; Test Methods 
FSC MISC 
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Military 
MIL-STD-143 Standards and Specifications, Order of 
Precedence for the Selection of 
Qualification of Inspection Personnel MIL-STD-4l0 
MIL-STD-453 
MIL-STD-860 
MIL-STD-1530 
(Magnetic Particle and Penetrant) 
Inspection, Radiographic 
Fokk~~)Ultrasonic Adhesive Bond Test 
Aircraft Structural Integrity Program 
Requirements 
MIL-Sl'D-1537 Electrical Conductivity Test for Measurement 
of Heat Treatment of Aluminum Alloys, 
Eddy Current Method 
PAMPHLETS 
AMCP 702-10 
AMCP 702-11 
Guidance to Nondestructive Testing Techniques 
Guide to Specifying NDT in Materiel Life 
Cycle Applications 
(Copies of specifications, standards, drawings, and publications required 
by suppliers in connection with sp~c1fic procurement functions should be 
oOta1neo from the procuring ~~Livity as di~€cted by the eo~t=~cting 
officer. ) 
2.2 Other publications. The following documents form a part of this 
specification to the extent specified herein. Unless otherwise 
indicated, the issue in effect on date of invitation for bids or request 
for proposal shall apply. 
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS 
ASTM B-244 
ASTM B-342 
ASTM E-113 
ASTM E-164 
ASTM E-2l5 
Measuring Thickness of Anodic Coatings Qn Aluminum 
with Eddy Current Instruments 
Electrical Conductivity by Use of Eddy Currents 
Recommended Practice for Ultrasonic Testing by the 
Resonance Method 
Standard Method for Ultrasonic Contact Inspection 
of Weldments 
Recommended Practice for Standardizing Equipment 
for Electromagnetic Testing of Seamless Aluminum 
Alloy Tubing 
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ASTM E-309 
ASTM E-376 
ASTM E-426 
ASTM E-427 
MIL-I-6870C 
Recommended Practice for Eddy Current Testing of 
Steel Tubular Products with Magnetic Saturation 
Recommended Practice for Measuring ~oating Thickness 
by Magnetic Field or Eddy Current (Electromagnetic) 
Test Methods 
Recommended Practice for Electromagnetic (Eddy Current) 
Testing of Seamless and Welded Tubular Products, 
Austenite Stainless Steel and Similar Alloys 
Reco~ended Practice for Testing of Leaks Using the 
Halogen Detector (Alkali-Ion Diode) 
(Application for copies should be addressed to the American Society for 
Testing and Materials, 1916 Race Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
19103.) 
AMERICAN SOCIETY,FOR NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTING 
SNT-TC-lA Recommended Practice, Supplement A Radiographic Testing 
Method, Supplement C, Ultrasonic Testing Method, 
Supplement E, Eddy Current Testing Method, 
No~destructive Testing Personnel Qualification and 
Cettification 
(Applications for copies of the above publications should be addressed 
to the American Society for Nondestructive Testing, 914 Chicago Avenue, 
Evanston, Illinois 60202.) 
AMERICAN WELDING\ SOCIETY 
AWS-A.2.2 Nondestructive Testing Symbols 
(Copies of the above ppblication may be obtained from the Naval Publi-
cations and Forms Center (Code 1051), 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania 19120.) 
(Non-Government requests should be addressed to the American Welding 
Society, 3690 N.W. 50th Street, Miami, Florida 33142.) 
3. REQUIREMENTS 
3.1 Preparation of NDT plan. The contractor (5.6) shall establish in 
writing an overall systems plan to assure adequate nondestructive testing 
of all materials and applicable safety of flight components in an aircraft 
or missile system. The objective of this plan is to achieve a level of 
nondestructive testing consistent with design requirements. 
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3.1.1 Applicability. This plan shall include and be applicable to 
materials, safety of flight, structures and guidance control components 
produced by the contractor, subcontractors (5.8), and suppliers (5.9). 
3.1.2 Elements. This plan shall present the scheme for establishing 
the NDT requirements and implementing procedures to meet these require-
ments. It shall include the means of: 
a. Conducting a materials and parts classification. 
b. Coordination of design requirements and NDT procedures. 
~. Preparing NDT procedures. 
d. Implementing NDT procedures. 
e. Staging or scheduling of testing during processing, 
fabrication, and assembly. 
3.1.3 Coord1nation. This plan shall be coordinated with the Aircratt 
Structural Integrity Plan (ASIP) when MIL-STD-1530 is a contractual 
requirement. 
3.2 Mater1als and parts class1fication. The contractor shall classify 
all materials and parts in an a1rcraft or missile system on the basis 
of funct10n and quality according to the structural integrity require-
mpntc;. 
3.2.1 Class. Class refers to functional reliability requirements of 
the material or part and implies a conf1dence level requirement for 
NDT. A high-reliability class may require redundant testin& to assure 
adequate NDT confidence level. 
Class 1 - Components which are fracture or fatigue critical 
(5.4) or components the single failure of which 
would cause significant danger to operat1ng personnel 
or would result in an operational penalty~ This 
includes Joss of major components, loss of control, 
unintentional release, inability to release armament 
stores, or failure of weapon installation components. 
Class lA - A Class 1 component, the single failure of which would 
result in the loss of an aircraft or missile system. 
Class lB - Class 1 components not included in Class lA. 
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Class 2 All components not classified as Class 1. 
Class 2A Components having a margin of safety of 200 percent 
or less. 
Class 2B - Components having a mar~in of safety greater than 
200 percent. 
3.2.2 Grade. The grade of a component is a measure of quality level 
and impl1es a defect sensitiv1ty requirement for NOT. The grade is 
defined in terms of defect size, location, type, and frequency which 
are acceptable. High and low stress areas on the same component can 
have different grade levels. The grade level shall be based on the 
acceptable defect limits. 
3.3 NOT reguirement review board. The contractor shall appoint an 
NDT requirement reV1ew board made up of technical personnel to 
implement and monitor the nondestructive testing plan. 
3.3.1 Personnel. The NOT requ1rement review board shall be selected 
from the contractor's experienced design analysis, manufacturing and 
NDT personnel as def1ned below. The select10n of this board shall be 
subject to the approval of the Government contract1ng agency (5.2). 
3.3.1.1 Design analys1s representat1ve(s). Th~ u~&i~n analysis 
personnel shall be familiar with the overall design requirements of the 
aircraft or missile system. In particular they shall be knowledgeable 
of the service life criteria and the damage tolerance analysis for the 
materials and parts for which inspection requirements are to be 
established. 
3.3.1.2 Manufacturing representative(s). The manufacturing personnel 
shall be familiar with all process, manufacturing, and assembly 
operations associated with the a1rcraft or missile system. They shall 
be knowledgeable of the influence of these operations on subsequent 
inspectability of materials and parts. 
3.3.1.3 Nondestructive inspection representative(s). The NDT personnel 
shall be knowledgeable of the capab1l1ties and l1mitat10ns of the NDT 
techniques used in examining and testing materials and parts for the 
aircraft or missile system. 
3.3.2 Function. The NDT requirements review board shall review the 
nondestruct1ve testing requirements for all materials and parts in an 
aircraft or missile system to assure that the most effective and complete 
testing technique(s) have been selected for the materials and parts 
being tested, and that the level and scheduling of inspection is commen-
surate with the quality requ1red. The representative(s) of design 
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analysis, manufacturing, and nondestructive testing shall interact to 
certify that the tcst1ng requirements arc compatible with the design 
requirements as expressed by the class and grade of the materials and 
parts classification. Th1s certification, or lack thereof, shall be 
documented as described later in this specification. The NDT require-
ments review board shall have available from its participants 
information and data according to the following responsibilities. Non 
NDT personnel of the board needing a basic understanding of NDT should 
refer to AMCP702-l0 and AMCP702-ll. 
3.3.2.1 Des1gn analysis represcntat1ve(s). The design analysis 
represenlat1ve shall provide the board information and data on the 
acceptable l1mits of defects in the materials and parts under consider-
ation. This shall include part configuration, acceptable defect size, 
critical locations and orientations, and primary stress conditions and 
directions 
3.3.2.2 ~lanufacturing representative(s). The manufacturing representa-
tive(s) shall provide the board information and data on the stages and 
limitat10ns of processing, manufacturing and assembly at which nondestruc-
tive testing can be ach1eved. This shall include information and data 
on access1bility, surface f1nish, or other conditions which may influence 
inspectability. 
3.3.2.3 Nondestructive testing representative(s). The ,nondestructive 
test1ng reprcser.tative(s) shall prov1de the board information and data 
on Lllt:~ ::'~ll::,i.Li.V.i.Ly dlll.i dJ.1pllLdu.i.llLY u[ rilll lechn.i.que:, [or the defect 
sizes, locations and or1entations, part geometries, and materials being 
cons1dered. 
3.3.3 Act10n of the board. The action of the NDT requirements review 
board on all mater1als and parts shall be documented on the drawing. 
The degree and nature of documentation is dependent on the material 
and part classification as described below. In all cases, the action 
will be signature approved by the authorized design analysiS, manufact-
uring, and nondestruct1ve testing representatives of the NUT require-
ments review board. 
3.3.3.1 Class 1 materials and parts. Specific inspection requirements 
must be made for all Class 1 mater1als and parts. The action shall 
include the part 1dentificat1on and configuration, the design require-
ments of acceptable defect size, critical locations and orientations, 
primary stress conditions and directions, the manufacturing recommend-
at10ns for point of testing, and the specification of NDT technique 
and sens1tivity. 
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3.3.3.2 Class 2 materials and parts. The action of the testing 
requirements board on Class 2 materials and parts shall include the 
part identification and the selection of the NDT technique(s) and 
quality level required. 
3.3.3.3 Discrepancy reports. In the event that the NDT requirements 
review board cannot a~h1eve conformance with the objectives of the 
NDT plan for a given material or part, a discrepancy report shall be 
issued for that material or part. This report shall identify the 
material or part, and describe the nature of the discrepancy. Th1s 
report shall be returned to the design analysis group for recons1der-
ation in terms of design requirements. 
3.3.4 Drawings. The NDT board action shall be the basis for specifi-
cation of NDT requirements on engineering production drawings. The 
board action may require a special drawing to reflect the NDT requ1re-
ments. 
3.3.4.1 Class 1. On all engineering and production drawings related 
to Class 1 materials and parts, the testing requirements shall be 
specified in summary form as follows: 
a. Acceptable defect size. 
h. C~itical locations Gild c~icnt~ticn~. 
c. Primary stress conditions and directions. 
The NDT symbols, if used, shall be in accordance with the symbol 
convention of AWS A.2.2. 
3.3.4.2 Class 2. On all engineering and production drawings related to 
Class 2 materials and parts, the quality level shall be specified. 
3.3.4.3 Zones. On all engineering and production drawings related to 
materials and parts in which the grade level varies with location, the 
drawing shall be zoned and the appropriate information as required in 
3.3.4.1 and 3.3.4.2 shall be entered for each zone. 
3.4 Preparation of NDT procedures and process specif1cations 
3.4.1 Use of general NDT process specificat~ons. The use of process 
specifications such as those listed in 2.1 and 2.2 as sole controlling 
documents is not permitted. These specifications reflect min1mum 
quality requirements and, of necess1ty, are broad in scope. 
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3.4.2 Company process specifications. Company process specifications 
shall be prepared incorporating the requirements of the referenced 
process specifications and in addition supplying detailed information 
necessary to meet or exceed these specifications using the particular 
equipment, personnel, and test facilities required to meet the 
reliability requirements of the product. If no general process 
specification exists for a particular method a company process specifi-
cat10n shall incorporate· sufficient information and criteria to 
adequately describe the NDT method and control the process. 
3.4.2.1 Standard procedures. Standard procedures to obtain various 
grade level tests and various confidence levels for the particular 
product(s) may be a part of these company process specifications. 
These standard procedures may be referenced to meet the detailed 
procedure requirements for Class 2 parts (3.4.3.1). 
3.4.2.2 Standardization. The company process specification shall 
reflect procedures and records to assure adequate quality assurance 
measures are being enforced to keep the NDT process in control. 
Basic process, equipment, materials, and technique variables shall be 
monitored and controlled to assure adequate control of the testing 
process. 
3.4.2.3 Approval. Company process specifications to be applied on 
aircraft and missile components must be approved by an authorizpd 
.... €pr€scr.tative of th~ \!Outu1cLor anu, tht! Government as specif1ed by 
the contract. 
3.4.3 Testing processes. The following methods of nondestructive 
testing are acceptable. 
a. Magnetic particle, in accordance with MIL-I-6868 as 
supplemented by an approved company process specification. 
b. Penetrant, in accordance with MIL-I-6866 as supplemented by 
an approved company process specification. 
c. Radiographic, in accordance with MIL-STD-453 as supplemented 
by an approved company process specification. 
d. Ultrasonic, in accordance with M~-I-8950 and ASTM E-113 
or E-164, if applicable, as supplemented by an approved 
company proces$ s',pecification. 
e. Eddy current, in ac~ordance with MIL-STD-1537 and ASTM B-244, 
B-342, E-215, E-309, E-376, or E-426 as applicable and as 
supplemented by an approveo company process specification. 
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f. Thermal, in accordance with an approved company process 
specification. 
g. Magnetic rubber in accordance with MIL-I-83387 as supple-
mented by an approved company process specification. 
h. Leak testing, in accordance with Feder~l Test Method Std. 
No. 151 and an approved company process specification. 
i. Adhesive bond strength testing in accordance with MIL-STD-860 
as supplem~nted by an approved company process specification. 
j. Other methodi, in accordance with an approved company process 
specificat10n or other industry document. 
3.4.4 Test ryrocedures. Test procedures will be provided for each part 
to be tested. These procedures shall be in accordance with the require-
ments of the component drawing, the company process specification, and 
shall contain the information listed below. 
3.4.4.1 Class 2 parts. Test procedures for parts shall include: 
a. Specific paTt number and configuration. 
b. Stage of fapricat10n. 
c. Surface fi~sh and pGrt preparation. 
d. Manufacture~ and model number of all instrumentation 
to be used. 
e. Fixturing r~quirements. 
f. Manufacturer and identification of all testing materials. 
g. Detailed procedure steps or reference to company process 
specification procedure if applicable. 
h. Calibration and standardization procedure. 
i. Acceptance and evaluation procedure. 
j. Precautions in use of test procedure. 
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3.4.4.2 Class 1 parts. Test procedures for Class 1 parts shall contain 
all of the items listed in 3.4.3.1 and in addition: 
~) . 
a. Drawings of the part to be tested with identification of 
areas to be tested and the direction and magnitude of 
primary stresses. 
b. Physical description of probable defects. 
c. Minimum acceptable defect size and orientation. 
d. Limitations of technique in defect sensitivity. 
e. Sources of noise signals and their identifications. 
f. Procedures for retesting by the same or alternate methods 
to provide adequate confidence level. 
3.4.4.3 Common product forms. General procedures are acceptable for 
common product forms such as plate and bar stock. The general proced-
ures shall cover as a minimum all of the items listed for the class of 
the components for which the material is to be used. 
3.5 Implementation of NDT procedures 
3.5.1 Personnel. The l'lVJ. facility shull have au ai1<'1ble records of 
certif~cat~on (5.1) for personnel conducting, directing and interpreting 
nondestructive tests in accordance w~th the following: 
a. Magnetic particle, in accordance with MIL-STD-4l0. 
b. Penetrant, in accordance w~th MIL-STD-4l0. 
c. Radiographic, in accordance with MIL-STD-453. 
d. Ultrasonic, in accordance with MIL-I-8950. 
e. Eddy current, in accordance with SNT-TC-lA, Supplement E. 
f. Others in accordance with the specific requirements of the 
contracting agency. 
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3.5.2 Test reports. Test reports with data records shall be kept on 
file by the NOT facility unless otherwise specified. Reports shall 
be signed by an authorized representative of the testing facility and 
the individual conducting and interpreting the test. 
~ 
3.5.3 Equipment and materials. The equipment and materials used for 
testing shall be in accordance with the applicable approved company 
process specification. 
3.5.4 Faci11ties. The physical plant used for NDT shall be such that 
it creates no unnecessary restrictions to the attainment of satisfactory 
testing. Housekeep1ng shall be maintained to assure equipment and 
materials are kept in good operating condition. Equipment should be 
marked to show adequate maintenance is being performed and that only 
operational and satisfactory equipment will be used to conduct a test. 
3.5.5 Procedure verification. All procedures shall be verified to 
assure adequate defect sensitivity and confidence level to meet the 
requirements for which it is intended. 
3.5.5.1 Class 2 parts. Procedures for parts may be verified on test 
pieces simulating the adtual part prov1ding the essential features 
of the part with regard to important application variables which may 
affect defect sensitivit~ and conf1dence level. 
3.5.5.2 Class 1 parts. ITocedures tor class 1 parts shall be ver1f1ed 
on test pieces as 1n 3.5.5.1 with add1t10nal verification by further 
tests on first items. Verification of adequate redundant testing to 
achieve the required con£idence level of the testing shall be provided 
during first item tests. 
3.5.6 Removal of discontinuities. When nondestructive testing reveals 
discontinuities in excess of the level permitted by applicable drawings 
or specifications, such discontinuities may be removed if permitted by 
applicable drawings and ~pecifications. Evidence of removal shall be 
shown by reinspect10n. f the defect is merely removed by grinding 
and surface blending, th retesting shall be conducted at a higher 
sensitivity level to assure complete removal. 
3.5.6.1 Retesting. Retesting for removal of discontinuities shall 
be conducted using an approved procedure. If a new procedure is to be 
used, an addendum to the or1ginal procedure shall be ~repared showing 
the essential features of the repair test. This addendum must be 
approved by an authorized represent~tive of the contractor. 
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3.5.7 Inspection scheduling 
3.5.7.1 Receiving inspections. On materials, parts, or assemblies 
suspected to have wide variations in quality from piece to piece, the 
contractor should establish an NDT sampling program to help assure 
that incoming materials, parts, or assemblies meet the engineering 
requirements. 
3.5.7.2 Manufacturing and a~sembly. Testing shall be performed as 
necessary dur1ng manufacture and assembly of components to insure 
freedom from harmful discontinuities in the final part or assembly. 
~ 
a. When processing operations are inv~ved which may in 
any way adversely affect the quaVity of material or 
part, such as heat treating, forging, or cold forging, 
NDT shall be performed subsequen~ to such operations. 
b. When processing operations are involved which may in any 
way interfere with the kind(s) of inspection to be 
used, inspection shall be perfo~d prior to such 
operations. 
3.5.8 Data and documentation. 
herein concerning preparation, 
retent10n, or uelivelY of data 
only to the extent prov1ded in 
Requirements exp,ressed as implied 
submittal, appro~al, availability, 
or documcnt~tion shall be appli~Ahl~ 
a DD Form 1423 irt the contract. 
4. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROVISIONS 
4.1 Responsibility for ~~T. Unless otherwise specified in the contract 
or purchase order, the supplier is responsible for the performance of 
all testing requirements as specified in the NDT program. Except as 
otherwise specified in the contract or order, the supplier may use his 
own or any other facilities suitable for the pe1formance of the testing 
requirements unless disapproved by the Government. The Government 
reserves the right to perform any test set forth in the specifications 
where such tests are deemed necessary to assure supplies and services 
conform to prescribed requirements. 
5. DEFINITIONS 
5.1 Certification. Certification shall mean written testimony of 
qualificat10n. The certifying agency must be tQe employer of the 
inspection personnel. 
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5.2 Contracting agency. A contractor, subcontractor, or Government 
agency procuring parts or services. 
5.3 Final inspection. The last inspection of a part or component, 
usually just prior to shipping. This may occur during manufacturing 
if the component become~ uninspectable at some later stage of fabri-
cation or if it is inspected just after some processing step and is 
not subject to reinspect ion after further processing. 
5.4 Fracture or fatigue cr1tical component. Components which are 
susceptible to crack initiation and propagation mechanism as established 
in MIL-STD-1530. 
5.5 NDT facility. NDT facility shall mean that organization responsible 
to the contractor and tHb subcontractor for nondestruct1ve testing 
services. 
5.6 Contractor. Contra~tor shall mean that organization having 
contractual responsibility to the Government. 
5.7 Qualification. The ability of personnel to meet the minimum 
requirements for a specified level of capability. 
5.8 Subcontractor. Sub;ontractor (supplier) shall mean that organiza-
lion r~bPollbiul~ Lo tltE! ",-UllL.L"clCLur [Ot d pOLtiull or tht:: Wt::dPOUS t>y6tt::1II. 
5.9 Supplier. The organization directly responsible for delivering 
a material, part, or senvice to the Government, a contractor, or a 
subcontractor. 
5.10 Nondestructive tesLing. Inspection processes or techniques 
intended to reveal conditions at or beneath the external surface of a 
part or material which cpnnot be evaluated solely by visual exam1nation 
with or without magnifi~ption or by dimensional measurement. 
6. NOTES 
6.1 Certification of personnel 
6.1.1 Radiographic personnel not working on Air Force Contracts may 
be certified in accordance with SNT-TC-lA. 
Custodians: 
Army - MR 
Navy - AS 
Air Force - 11 
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